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DO COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS BENEFIT
COMMUNITIES?
Edward W. De Barbieri †

Community Benefits Agreement (CBA) campaigns and public discussions
about community benefits are becoming the norm in deciding how large urban
projects are built outside of formal public land use approvals. CBAs have
revolutionized land use approvals for large, public-private economic development
projects: now developers and coalitions representing low-income communities can
settle their disputes before formal project approval. As a result, CBAs are now
commonplace nationwide.
Legal scholarship, however, has failed to keep up with these important
developments. This Article aims to do just that by examining how CBAs, when
properly negotiated, lower transaction costs, enhance civic participation, and protect
taxpayers. It argues that CBAs achieve all these outcomes well, and more efficiently
than existing government processes. Indeed, this Article’s central argument is that to
the extent that scholars have analyzed CBAs, their analyses have gone astray by
either dismissing CBAs as harmful to communities or by focusing on the role of the
state in negotiating what really should be a private contract between a coalition of
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community groups and a developer. It is a mistake to give the state’s role in CBAs
primacy over the community coalition because the inclusion of government in the
CBA bargaining process creates a host of constitutional protections for developers—
namely that the community benefits must be connected to and proportional with the
instant government approval.
This Article places focus back on CBAs as private contracts enforceable by
inclusive and representative community coalitions. It presents a case study of a
successful CBA negotiated for the development of the Kingsbridge National Ice
Center in the Bronx. This Article proposes a framework for assessing the impact of
CBAs in economic development—one that recognizes the nuanced role that states
and municipalities play in the formation and enforcement of CBAs. The framework
focuses on the extent to which CBAs (1) lower transaction costs by effectively
resolving disputes among developers and community groups, (2) increase civic
participation in public processes, (3) protect taxpayers, and (4) avoid government
intervention and constitutional protections for developers. This Article concludes
with recommendations for the appropriate, limited role of government in CBA
negotiations.
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INTRODUCTION
Today it is commonplace for developers to routinely negotiate and
provide economic benefits such as affordable housing, local hiring, and
living wages to communities where major developments are located. 1 In
practice, large developers bidding on economic development projects
deploy lobbyists to negotiate agreements with local opposition groups
and to win lucrative rights to build. 2 Community Benefits Agreements
(CBAs) are contracts between developers and a representative coalition
of community organizations. 3 The coalition exchanges public and
political support of a proposed development project for a slate of
economic benefits. 4 CBAs are now the standard practice for developers
and community groups to resolve disputes surrounding large
developments in many cities and towns across the country. 5

1 Christine A. Fazio & Judith Wallace, Essay, Legal and Policy Issues Related to Community
Benefits Agreements, 21 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 543, 544 (2010). Recently, CBAs have been
characterized as a type of "impact transaction"—referring to transactions for the public good,
similar to impact litigation that have the potential for effecting large scale social change.
Patience A. Crowder, Impact Transaction: Lawyering for the Public Good Through Collective
Impact Agreements, 49 IND. L. REV. 621, 630 (2016).
2 Lobbying at the local level is big business. Lobbyists with connections to elected officials,
including mayors or city council members, do especially well. The top ten lobbyists in New
York City, for example, reported compensation of almost seventy-two million dollars in 2014.
One firm that supported Mayor Bill de Blasio’s recent mayoral campaign reported earnings of
$8.2 million in 2014 (the year de Blasio was elected), up $4.6 million from 2013. LOBBYING
BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE CITY CLERK, ANNUAL REPORT 13 (2015), http://www.cityclerk.nyc.gov/
downloads/pdf/2014%20annual%20227%20Final%202.pdf; LOBBYING BUREAU, OFFICE OF THE
CITY CLERK, ANNUAL REPORT 16 (2014), http://www.cityclerk.nyc.gov/downloads/pdf/
LobbyingAnnualReport2014.pdf.
3 Policy & Tools: Community Benefits Agreements and Policies, PARTNERSHIP FOR
WORKING FAMILIES, http://www.forworkingfamilies.org/resources/policy-tools-communitybenefits-agreements-and-policies (last visited July 28, 2015).
4 JULIAN GROSS WITH GREG LEROY & MADELINE JANIS-APARICIO, GOOD JOBS FIRST &
CAL. P’SHIP FOR WORKING FAMILIES, COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS: MAKING
DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ACCOUNTABLE 10–11 (2005), http://www.goodjobsfirst.org/sites/
default/files/docs/pdf/cba2005final.pdf.
5 Terry Pristin, In Major Projects, Agreeing Not to Disagree, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2006, at
C6. One study highlighted twenty-seven CBAs in place nationwide. Laura Wolf-Powers,
Community Benefits Agreements and Local Government: A Review of Recent Evidence, 76 J. AM.
PLAN. ASS’N 141 (2010) [hereinafter Wolf-Powers, CBAs and Local Government]. Another
study highlighted CBAs, not just in California and New York City, but also in upstate New
York, Atlanta, Pittsburgh, Charleston, Miami, Milwaukee, Seattle, Minneapolis-St. Paul, and
Wilmington, as well as internationally in Toronto and Dublin. Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine,
Understanding Community Benefits Agreements: Equitable Development, Social Justice and
Other Considerations for Developers, Municipalities and Community Organizations, 26 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 291, 318 (2008) [hereinafter Salkin & Lavine, Understanding Community
Benefits Agreements].
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Although some scholars have written about CBAs, the scholarship
has not kept up with the rapid increase in implementation of CBAs. 6
Scholars who do analyze CBAs either dismiss them as harmful to
community interests, 7 or focus their attention on the state’s involvement
in negotiations and enforcement. 8 In contrast, this Article shines a
spotlight on the benefits of CBAs, presenting a framework for how and
when they can be beneficial, and argues, counter to some, that state
involvement is actually undesirable. When done properly, CBAs can
and do benefit communities.
Three recent development projects illuminate the wide variety of
current arrangements through which developers attempt to distribute
community economic benefits:
• In Chicago, community groups are calling for a CBA at the $600
million Obama Presidential Center, 9 yet Barack Obama
Foundation representatives have not embraced a CBA thus far,
arguing that smart and sustainable growth and anchoring public
and private investment in the community is already key to the
Center’s location on the South Side. 10
• In Atlanta in 2013, the City Council approved a community
benefits “plan” 11—not a binding CBA with a community
6 Some have even disputed that CBA use is widespread. See, e.g., Daniel P. Selmi, The
Contract Transformation in Land Use Regulation, 63 STAN. L. REV. 591, 642 (2011).
7 See, e.g., Fazio & Wallace, supra note 1, at 548 (arguing the limitations of CBAs in
benefiting communities, citing the example of the Atlantic Yards CBA and how it failed to
prevent litigation from community groups challenging various aspects of the project).
8 See, e.g., Vicki Been, Community Benefits Agreements: A New Local Government Tool or
Another Variation on the Exactions Theme?, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 5, 31–35 (2010) (arguing that
local government should not consider CBAs in land use approvals, or in the alternative if local
government does consider CBAs in land use approvals, any review should ensure that CBA
terms have a nexus to land use concerns, are transparent, representative, accountable, address
citywide concerns, and are enforceable).
9 Dahleen Glanton, Obama Library Raises Hopes, Fears About Economic Boom on South
Side, CHI. TRIB. (May 11, 2015, 5:01 AM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-obamalibrary-economics-20150511-story.html#page=1. In partnership with the University of Chicago,
a presidential library and museum is planned on the South Side of Chicago, and additional
programs are planned for the campus of Columbia University in New York City, as well as in
Honolulu, Hawaii, and in connection with the University of Illinois. Official Announcement,
Obama Found., Obama Presidential Center Coming to Chicago (May 12, 2015), http://
www.barackobamafoundation.org/announcements.
10 Glanton, supra note 9. Often developers claim that their development itself provides
economic benefits in the form of tax revenue to the local government, jobs, and the elimination
of blight; however, this claim belies the nature of CBAs as being separate and apart from
general economic benefits related to development. See GROSS WITH LEROY & JANIS-APARICIO,
supra note 4, at 3–4.
11 Dion Rabouin, City Council Unanimously Approves Benefits Plan for Communities
Around New Falcons Stadium, ATLANTA DAILY WORLD (Dec. 3, 2013), http://
atlantadailyworld.com/2013/12/03/city-council-unanimously-approves-benefits-plan-forcommunities-around-new-falcons-stadium; see also Atlanta Falcons Community-Benefits Plan,
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coalition—seeded with fifteen million dollars from The Arthur M.
Blank Family Foundation, 12 and a second fifteen million dollars
from the city’s economic development authority, 13 despite calls
from community leaders for a CBA 14 surrounding the
development of a new Atlanta Falcons stadium. 15
• In Maine, Somerset County Commissioners recently approved a
wind farm tax abatement district after the developer agreed to pay
an annual per-turbine fee for the next twenty years as part of a
“community benefit agreement.”16 The funds may be spent in any
manner directed by commissioners anywhere in the county. 17
In none of these three examples is there an enforceable CBA with
community organizations to help guide the distribution of economic
benefits. An enforceable CBA, negotiated with an inclusive,
representative, and accountable coalition is key to how CBAs benefit
communities. In contrast to the examples from Chicago, Atlanta, and
Maine, Part II of this Article presents an example of a CBA where a
community has a contractual role in distributing benefits negotiated
around a significant economic development project.
The Kingsbridge National Ice Center CBA is the first “credible”
CBA in New York City, 18 negotiated by the city’s first inclusive
SCRIBD., https://www.scribd.com/doc/188765618/Atlanta-Falcons-Community-Benefits-Plan
(last visited Aug. 10, 2015).
12 Westside Neighborhood Prosperity Fund Background, ARTHUR M. BLANK FAM. FOUND.,
http://www.blankfoundation.org/westside-fund-background (last visited July 29, 2015). Arthur
M. Blank is the cofounder of Atlanta-based home improvement retailer The Home Depot.
Arthur Blank, Chairman, ARTHUR M. BLANK FAM. FOUND., http://blankfoundation.org/arthurblank (last visited July 24, 2015).
13 Press Release, Invest Atlanta, Invest Atlanta Announces Application Process for Westside
Tax Allocation District Community Improvement Fund (Jan. 13, 2014), http://
investatlanta.com/wp-content/uploads/Invest-Atlanta-Announces-Application-Process-forWestside-Tax-Allocation-District-Community-Improvement-Fund-FINAL.pdf.
14 Equality Atlanta, Making the Case for Vine City and English Avenue, YOUTUBE (Nov. 14,
2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=StSY5HRorpA.
15 Fast Facts: Mercedes-Benz Stadium by the Numbers, MERCEDES-BENZ STADIUM, http://
mercedesbenzstadium.com/stadium-info/fast-facts (last visited Mar. 1, 2016).
16 Community Benefit Agreement Between the County of Somerset, Maine, and Blue Sky
West, LLC (Dec. 22, 2014) (on file with author); Rachel Ohm, Somerset County Approves Wind
Farm TIF District, CENTRALMAINE.COM (Dec. 23, 2014), http://www.centralmaine.com/2014/
12/22/somerset-county-approves-wind-farm-tif-district. The county approved a tax increment
financing, or TIF, district, which would allow both the county to collect a portion of future
property tax increases and First Wind to pay less future property taxes. Id.
17 Ohm, supra note 16.
18 Press Release, Josh Epstein, DLA Piper, DLA Piper and Urban Justice Center
Congratulate the Kingsbridge Armory Redevelopment Alliance on Their Historic Community
Benefits Agreement (Apr. 23, 2013) [hereinafter DLA Piper Press Release], http://
www.dlapiperprobono.com/news/latest-news/2013/kingsbridge-armory-redevelopmentalliance.html.
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grassroots CBA coalition. 19 The case study of the Kingsbridge National
Ice Center CBA provides analysis and lessons learned that can be useful
in negotiating CBAs around other major developments. The case study
illustrates with particularity exactly when and how a CBA can benefit a
specific community.
In Part III, this Article proposes a framework for assessing the
impact of CBAs on economic development. The framework focuses on
the extent to which CBAs (1) lower transaction costs by effectively
resolving disputes among developers and community groups, (2)
increase civic participation in public processes, (3) protect taxpayers by
holding developers to the commitments they make, and (4) avoid
government regulation and constitutional protections for developers.
Not only are CBAs a welcome addition to local public land use review
processes, they are becoming the norm for how developers and
communities settle disputes.
I. CBAS EMERGE IN LAND USE LAW
The notion of “citizen participation in public decision-making is a
‘little like eating spinach: no one is against it in principle because it is
good for you.’” 20 The problem of civic participation in the CBA context
is how to achieve a community coalition bargaining team that is
representative of a variety of community interests. CBA scholarship in
support of CBAs highlights the flexibility of CBAs to reach terms that
agreements between developers and the government cannot. Scholars
who highlight the challenges of CBAs talk about the problem of
obtaining an inclusive coalition.
This Part advances the argument that CBAs are the law outside of
the law for public land use decision in two ways: First, scholars have
looked at CBAs the wrong way. Specifically, agreements that do not
involve an inclusive coalition obviously are likely to fail. These
agreements should not be called CBAs. Second, it is possible for a
community coalition to have an inclusive, representative, and
accountable negotiating team. Instances of these types of coalitions exist
throughout the literature. In Part II, this Article presents a case study of
a precedent setting CBA involving an inclusive community coalition.
19 Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Community Benefits Agreements and Comprehensive
Planning: Balancing Community Empowerment and the Police Power, 18 J.L. & POL’Y 157, 210
(2009) [hereinafter Salkin & Lavine, Balancing Community Empowerment].
20 Thomas A. Musil, The Sleeping Giant: Community Benefit Agreements and Urban
Development, 44 URB. LAW. 827, 829 (2012) (quoting Sherry R. Arnstein, A Ladder of Citizen
Participation, 35 J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N 216 (1969)).
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This Part begins with a discussion of CBAs in the legal academic
literature. It then describes CBA origins as an outgrowth of community
organizing campaigns. Next, it discusses how CBAs are formed and how
they work.
Arguments in the literature in support of CBAs are introduced,
focusing on the use of CBAs to bring living wage jobs to local workers.
Then, arguments in the literature against the use of CBAs are discussed,
centering on claims of extortion by community groups, lack of
representation of the community groups themselves, and the likelihood
for government corruption and insider dealing.
A.

CBAs and Land Use Scholarship

The first CBAs were negotiated in Los Angeles around fifteen years
ago. They arose out of local hiring and living wage campaigns led by
nonprofit community organizing groups. 22 CBAs revolutionized land
use approvals for economic development projects since, for the first
time, developers and coalitions representing low-income communities
settled their disputes about specific projects before the projects were
approved. 23
Although CBAs are prevalent nationwide, 24 the term CBA has
expanded to include agreements where local government officials
replace the coalition as the negotiating party. 25 Although it may seem
counterintuitive, the inclusion of government in the CBA bargaining
process creates a host of constitutional protections for developers.26
Under the unconstitutional conditions doctrine, these protections limit
the scope of what developers can exchange for a public land use
approval. 27 Perhaps as a result, scholars in the legal academic literature
have recently focused on the role of the state in negotiating what really
21

21 GROSS WITH LEROY & JANIS-APARICIO, supra note 4, at 14–19; Salkin & Lavine,
Understanding Community Benefits Agreements, supra note 5, at 301–07.
22 Salkin & Lavine, Understanding Community Benefits Agreements, supra note 5, at 301;
Lee Romney, Community, Developers Agree on Staples Plan, L.A. TIMES, May 31, 2001, at A1.
23 For a visual diagram showing the altering of contractual relationships between the
developer, various community groups, and government, see GROSS WITH LEROY & JANISAPARICIO, supra note 4, at 12–13.
24 See supra note 5.
25 Currently, scholars use the term CBA to refer to both private contracts and contracts
involving government. Wolf-Powers, CBAs and Local Government, supra note 5, at 141.
26 Been, supra note 8, at 19 (arguing that CBAs may allow municipalities to bypass
constitutional protections that come with government involvement in land use regulation).
27 Id. at 13–14.
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should be a private contract between a coalition of community groups
and a developer. 28
The existing literature misses the point about CBAs. The
scholarship has not kept up with their rapid development and fails to
accurately assess the importance of the CBA movement in influencing
economic development. CBAs deserve greater attention because they
operate largely outside of what is written in the law of public land use.
They should be celebrated, not shunned merely because there are no
standardized CBA laws enacted. 29 CBAs are emerging as an extra-legal
way to facilitate public land use approvals and are altering how
developments are negotiated.
If it is true, as scholars have recently observed, that public land use
debates are stale, 30 perhaps a renewed emphasis on CBAs will freshen up
the conversation. By settling disputes prelitigation, properly negotiated
CBAs may actually lower transaction costs for developers. CBAs bring
an added certainty of securing project approval 31 that benefits
developers when they approach investors and lenders in the capital
markets and protects the developers’ investment. CBAs are effective
when (1) the community coalition is inclusive of, representative of, and
accountable to a spectrum of community interests; and (2) the
government is not a party. 32
Leading scholars have argued that policymakers and economists
tend to overestimate the benefits of government regulation. 33 CBA
negotiations function as a Coasean bargain between private parties,34
where developers and community groups attempt to arrive at an
agreeable value for the development of a particular project. Ronald
Coase pointed out that efficient bargains that may occur when
transaction costs are low will be prevented when transaction costs are
high. 35 While the upfront costs of negotiating a CBA are typically high
Id. at 18–19.
The City of Detroit is considering a local ordinance requiring CBAs for projects above a
certain size. See infra Section I.F. Other examples include the Maine wind farm statute, see
discussion supra Introduction, the report on Public Benefits Agreements to NYC Comptroller
John C. Liu, see discussion infra Section I.F, and the Washington, D.C., Planned Unit
Development (PUD) law. See discussion infra Section I.C.
30 See, e.g., David Schleicher, City Unplanning, 122 YALE L.J. 1670 (2013).
31 GROSS WITH LEROY & JANIS-APARICIO, supra note 4, at 10.
32 Julian Gross, Community Benefits Agreements: Definitions, Values, and Legal
Enforceability, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 35, 39–40 (2008)
[hereinafter Gross, Community Benefits Agreements].
33 See, e.g., R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 18 (1960).
34 Laura Wolf-Powers, Community Benefits Agreements in a Value Capture Context, in
VALUE CAPTURE AND LAND POLICIES 217, 218 (Gregory K. Ingram & Yu-Hung Hong eds.,
2012) [hereinafter Wolf-Powers, Value Capture].
35 Coase, supra note 33, at 15–16.
28
29
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in terms of organizing and working with lawyers, over time, the costs of
a well-settled agreement may be less than the costs of prolonged
litigation.
Scholars often cite failed CBAs, or agreements that should not be
called CBAs, to support arguments for why CBAs are too costly to
negotiate. 36 Generally, scholars mistakenly refer to agreements
negotiated by noninclusive coalitions as CBAs; rather, they use the term
CBA to describe agreements involving only a few groups that do not
comprise an inclusive coalition of representative interests. 37 This Article
argues that CBAs should refer only to a limited category of agreements
entered into between a developer and a coalition of community groups
concerning a single development because they are truly unique
contracts in their ability to achieve terms that rarely occur elsewhere in
land use law. 38
In addition to lowering transaction costs and bargaining outside
government regulation, CBAs have the power to bring more dense
development to cities. Density, some argue, is the reason cities are more
productive than other areas. 39 Yet, as Ryan Avent writes, many cities are
losing competitiveness because of a lack of affordable housing and
stifling government regulation. 40 CBAs can help development move
forward in a way that encourages the growth of productive urban cores
by resolving conflict and facilitating bargains that public processes do
not facilitate. CBAs may also have a role to play in managing
development in rural areas, such as in parts of Maine and in other
locations, as discussed in the Section below.
36 See, e.g., Lance Freeman, Atlantic Yards and the Perils of Community Benefit Agreements,
PLANETIZEN: BLOG (May 7, 2007, 5:00 AM), https://www.planetizen.com/node/24335
(criticizing the Atlantic Yards CBA in downtown Brooklyn). However, the Atlantic Yards CBA
had no mechanism to ensure the community was represented in the agreement. See id.
37 See, e.g., Policy & Tools: Community Benefits Agreements and Policies, supra note 3
(defining a CBA as a project-specific agreement where a developer and a broad coalition of
community groups exchange community contributions for project support). Julian Gross, a
leading CBA practitioner and author, argues that only standalone agreements between
community groups and developers should be termed CBAs, since they (1) can be enforced by
the affected community stakeholders, and (2) are private contracts. Julian Gross, Commentary
on Community Benefits Agreements in a Value Capture Context, in VALUE CAPTURE AND LAND
POLICY 229, 230–31 (Gregory K. Ingram & Yu-Hung Hong eds., 2012) [hereinafter Gross,
Commentary]. Laura Wolf-Powers, a leading CBA scholar, more broadly defines CBAs as “a set
of programmatic and material commitments that a private developer has made to win public
support from” area residents and other stakeholders. Wolf-Powers, Value Capture, supra note
34, at 218; Wolf-Powers, CBAs and Local Government, supra note 5.
38 See Gross, Commentary, supra note 37, at 229–30.
39 See, e.g., Ryan Avent, Opinion, One Path to Better Jobs: More Density in Cities, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/04/opinion/sunday/one-path-tobetter-jobs-more-density-in-cities.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
40 RYAN AVENT, THE GATED CITY ch. 1 (2011).

DE BARBIERI.37.5.3 (Do Not Delete)

2016]

6/6/2016 2:58 PM

COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS

1783

CBAs are not without challenges. Potential downsides range from
unenforceability, 41 to trouble organizing the coalition, 42 to claims of
extortion. 43 Nevertheless, CBAs continue to have a far-reaching impact
on development projects nationally.
B.

Community Organizers Develop CBA Campaigns

The movement to organize for CBAs is founded in progressive
political action. Specifically, CBA campaigns come out of a community
organizing tradition that disrupts power and the relations of power in a
local community. CBA campaigns through contract law principals are
intrinsically connected to community economic development (CED)
law.
CED lawyering emerged in the 1990s as the dominant form of
poverty alleviation as a market-based response to traditional entitlement
programs. 44 Scott Cummings has argued for a new approach to CED
practice that reconnects to its politically activist roots by deploying
transactional lawyering in support of strategies such as living wage
campaigns, worker ownership drives, and organizing-based jobs
initiatives. 45 CBA campaigns are an example of this alternative CED
practice, in that CBAs often include terms regarding living wage, local
hiring preferences, and other benefits for low-income workers and
tenants.
Coalitions of grassroots activists and lawyers, spurred on by
successes in the movement to increase living wages, began using local
business subsidies to direct economic benefits to low-income
communities. 46 This led to the Figueroa Corridor Coalition for
Economic Justice in Los Angeles winning a community benefits plan

Been, supra note 8, at 27–28.
Salkin & Lavine, Understanding Community Benefits Agreements, supra note 5, at 320.
43 Pristin, supra note 5 (quoting New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg as saying that
development projects will not be an opportunity “for everybody else that wants to grab
something”).
44 Scott L. Cummings, Community Economic Development as Progressive Politics: Toward a
Grassroots Movement for Economic Justice, 54 STAN. L. REV. 399, 400 (2001). One significant
shift in antipoverty programs to CED was the 1999 New Markets Tax Credits initiative, where
the Clinton Administration pledged over one billion dollars in tax breaks and loan assistance to
businesses in poor areas. Id. at 399 n.1. Scholars have observed that this new wave of marketbased CED policy has largely failed to alleviate poverty; for instance, market-based CED has
mostly facilitated public financing of low-wage, dead-end jobs. Id. at 407–08.
45 Id. at 408–09.
46 Id. at 479.
41
42
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surrounding the billion dollar development of the L.A. Live sports and
entertainment complex. 47
As has been discussed in the literature, the first step in a CBA
campaign is organizing the coalition. 48 Additional steps include building
support among elected officials, educating the press and the public, and
negotiating with developers. 49 A developer’s self-interest in a CBA
negotiation stems from a developer’s need for public support for a
subsidy or particular government approval. 50
It is key for a CBA coalition to be representative of as many of the
varying community interests surrounding the project as possible. 51
Therefore, community organizers need to do what they do best: reach
out to community participants. 52 In certain CBA campaigns where the
CBA coalition was not representative of differing views in the
community, such as was the case with Atlantic Yards, CBAs are not
likely to be accepted or seen as legitimate by the community. 53 This
Article will return to the issue of effectiveness of civic engagement and
its impact on the success or failure of CBAs and CBA campaigns in later
Sections.
C.

How CBAs Work

Community organizing groups, and the members they organize,
have limited available mechanisms to influence publically supported
economic development projects. 54 Individuals may testify at land use

Id. at 480.
See, e.g., Memorandum, David Marcello, Pub. Law Ctr., A “Concentric Circles” Model
for Organizing Community Benefit Agreements (Mar. 15, 2007) (on file with author).
49 Id.
50 GROSS WITH LEROY & JANIS-APARICIO, supra note 4, at 10.
51 Gross, Community Benefits Agreements, supra note 32, at 45; Salkin & Lavine,
Understanding Community Benefits Agreements, supra note 5, at 321.
52 Salkin & Lavine, Understanding Community Benefits Agreements, supra note 5, at 321.
Note that in the context of participatory budgeting, a process where citizens vote to award
public funds to different capital projects—not too dissimilar in some respects from the spirit of
a CBA campaign—a recent report indicated that outreach to nonwhite participants was key to
including community members from diverse backgrounds. Linell Ajello, Participatory
Budgeting Swells, and So Do Questions About Impact, CITY LIMITS (July 2, 2015), http://
citylimits.org/2015/07/02/participatory-budgeting-swells-and-so-do-questions-about-impact/
?utm_content=bufferbbbf7&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=
buffer.
53 William Ho, Community Benefits Agreements: An Evolution in Public Benefits
Negotiation Processes, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 7, 28 (2007); Salkin
& Lavine, Understanding Community Benefit Agreements, supra note 5, at 320.
54 Gross, Community Benefits Agreements, supra note 32, at 37–38.
47
48
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approval hearings, 55 lobby elected officials, 56 or in some cases, use
litigation strategies to delay or derail project approvals. 57 These
strategies often frustrate the parties involved, and in most cases, limit
the ability of local residents to meaningfully influence development in
their neighborhoods. 58 As a result, organizers have formed coalitions of
low-income workers, faith communities, and labor unions to negotiate
directly with developers to win community economic benefits tied to
specific projects, furthering equitable development and social justice
ends. 59
Campaigns to win CBAs on particular projects are part of a
strategy community organizers can use by leveraging their base of
members to bring developers to the negotiating table. 60 In most cases,
CBAs are negotiated before a project is approved, and the delivery of
benefits occurs during and after construction. 61 Community organizing
groups, faith congregations, and unions support CBA campaigns
because CBAs have the ability to win affordable housing development,
living wages for local residents, and dedicated space for community
activities. 62 Critics claim that CBAs are outright extortion by politically
connected, unelected, antidevelopment dissidents. 63
CBA negotiations typically begin when a local government, or a
developer, proposes a particular economic development project. A CBA
is formed when the developer makes an agreement with a coalition of
community organizations who represent groups of people most
immediately affected by the proposed development. The coalition of
community groups agree not to oppose the development in exchange
for a promise from the developer to provide some form of community
benefit, such as a certain amount of affordable housing, for example.64
Usually, the CBA is private between the developer and the coalition.
Recently, some local governments have taken part in CBAs. 65 Though,
Id. at 38.
See Telephone Interview with Alice McIntosh, infra note 134.
57 Been, supra note 8, at 19.
58 Id. at 15–16.
59 See discussion supra Section I.B.
60 See discussion infra Section II.A.1.
61 See discussion infra Section II.A.3.
62 See, e.g., SUSTAINABLE PORT CHESTER ALL., COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENT
BACKGROUND PACKET (2016), http://portchesteralliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/
CBA-Background-Packet_Sust-PC-Alliance_Compressed.pdf.
63 See discussion infra Section I.E.1.
64 GROSS WITH LEROY & JANIS-APARICIO, supra note 4, at 9–10.
65 CBAs involving local governments have been characterized as “public CBAs.” Gross,
Community Benefits Agreements, supra note 32, at 45. Although, Julian Gross points out in a
more recent writing that including “public CBAs” in the CBA definition is overly broad and
that it confuses the unique aspects of a CBA, namely, that it is private and enforceable by
55
56
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as mentioned above, agreements involving government officials make
community coalitions less relevant in negotiating and enforcing CBA
terms. Therefore, this Article will define CBAs only as agreements
between community coalitions and developers.
The definitional issue is central to forming the argument advanced
in this Article, namely, that CBAs between community coalitions and
developers are important because they give local residents key rights in
enforcing meaningful benefits of public development projects. It is
important for policymakers to realize that only CBAs involving
community coalitions should be given any weight in deciding whether
to approve or deny a particular project. The role of government officials
in negotiating benefits surrounding development is materially different
than the role of community groups. Specifically, conditions set by
government actors must have “nexus” and “rough proportionality” to
the requested approval. 66 CBAs negotiated by community groups do not
have these same restrictions. Nevertheless, community groups can
negotiate CBAs alongside government negotiators for separate terms
that are complimentary in a final project approval.
The types of benefits agreed upon in CBAs may also often be
implemented through planned unit developments (PUDs), or
development agreements. 67 PUDs are parcels of land that can be
developed by a single landowner in a manner that does not directly
correspond to lot size, bulk, density, lot coverage, type of use, required
open space, or other typical zoning mandates. 68 Development
agreements, which take different forms in various jurisdictions, can
contain a series of community benefits commitments. Such
commitments may also be incorporated into government or agency
resolutions, or into permits issued as part of land use approval
processes. 69
community groups against a developer. Gross, Commentary, supra note 37, at 229–30. A 2010
report to New York City Comptroller John C. Liu coined the term “public benefit agreement”
or “PBA.” TASK FORCE ON PUB. BENEFIT AGREEMENTS, CITY OF N.Y., RECOMMENDATIONS
(2010), http://landuselaw.wustl.edu/Articles/Community%20Benefits%20Agreements%20TaskForce-Report-Final.pdf. Use of the term PBA has not yet become commonplace.
66 See discussion infra Section III.D.2.
67 Several cities, such as Washington, D.C., already have a PUD ordinance in effect, which
allows developers to create mixed-use communities based upon an officially approved plan. See
Planned Unit Development Procedures, D.C. Mun. Regs. tit. 11, § 24 (2015); Nicole Stelle
Garnett, Redeeming Transect Zoning?, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 571, 587 n.64 (2013). The PUD
approval process encourages negotiation between local governments and developers. JULIAN
CONRAD JUERGENSMEYER & THOMAS E. ROBERTS, LAND USE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT
REGULATION LAW 271 (3d ed. 2013).
68 JUERGENSMEYER & ROBERTS, supra note 67, at 261–62.
69 Gross, Community Benefits Agreements, supra note 32, at 47.
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Arguments for CBAs

CBAs inject, through progressive political action, the ability for
citizens to engage in negotiations about the land use decisions that affect
them. Public approval processes for major economic development
projects typically exclude low income and other vulnerable
communities. 70 However, community economic benefits commitments
are meaningless unless legally enforceable by the individuals and groups
that the benefits are intended to reach. Without enforcement, private
developers receive project approval, and typically, significant taxpayer
funded subsidies or subsidized land, without ongoing commitments to
provide the benefits they promised.
CBAs have the potential to enhance the project approval process
for public land use. Community groups tend to like CBAs because
community groups have a greater role in shaping the development
process. The public impacts of CBA campaigns can be profound with
respect to increased minimum wages, affordable housing, open spaces,
and other community benefits.
1.

Living Wages for Local Workers

As community organizing campaigns across the country seek to
increase local minimum wages, CBAs are an important tool in enacting
higher living wages. As mentioned above, CBA campaigns developed as
an outgrowth of movements to increase living wages. In some instances,
CBA campaigns have led to municipality-wide living wage laws. 71 A
70 Been, supra note 8, at 16–17 (discussing complaints by community groups that they have
less opportunity for input when the local government approval process is preempted by county,
state, federal, or special authority approval).
71 One result of the 2009 Kingsbridge Armory CBA campaign was that the New York City
Council passed the Fair Wages for New Yorkers Act, which requires developers of certain
projects receiving at least one million dollars in financial assistance for economic development
to pay employees a living wage tied to the consumer price index. N.Y.C., N.Y.,
ADMINISTRATIVE CODE tit. 6, § 6-134 (2015). Although the Act passed the Council on April 30,
2012, it was vetoed by then Mayor Michael Bloomberg, whose veto was overridden by the
Council on June 28, 2012. See File No. Int. 0251-2010, N.Y.C. COUNCIL, http://
legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=664291&GUID=A83A5A5B-9589-4589AAD7-5B2C6884610F (last visited July 24, 2015); see also City Renews Efforts to Redevelop
Kingsbridge Armory, CITYLAND (Feb. 15, 2012), http://www.citylandnyc.org/city-renewsefforts-to-redevelop-kingsbridge-armory. Mayor Bloomberg sued the Council claiming the law,
which required developers and their tenants to pay employees ten dollars per hour plus $1.50
per hour in a “health benefits supplement,” would hinder job creation and industry growth.
Nick Gardner, NYC Mayor Says ‘Living Wage Law’ Is Preempted and Invalid (N.Y.Sup.Ct.),
WESTLAW LAB. & EMP. DAILY BRIEFING, Dec. 18, 2013, 2013 WL 6645414. Mayor Bill de Blasio,
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core principle of most CBA campaigns is a desire that jobs (with living
wages), as well as other benefits, be offered to residents in
neighborhoods surrounding the development first. 72
2.

Equitable Development and Economic Justice

As the number and frequency of CBA campaigns increases
nationwide, CBAs are increasingly seen as the cost of doing business for
major development projects. 73 The primary arguments supporting
CBAs include a range of perspectives that advance concepts of equity
and justice. 74 The overwhelming goal of community groups in
negotiating CBAs is fighting poverty. 75 One study indicated that
“economic justice” was the number one community goal in negotiating
a CBA. 76
It is a primarily goal of this Article to assess the extent to which
CBAs actually achieve equitable development, and if so, equitable to
who? This Article will return to the notion of equitable development in
the case studies in Part II, as well as in the analysis in Part III.
E.

Arguments Against CBAs

There are several arguments against CBAs, or at least arguments
suggesting strong caution in widely adopting CBA negotiation
procedures. CBA criticisms range from the rhetorical, which are
typically made by politicians who would prefer that CBAs not exist, to

who took office in January 2014, dropped the lawsuit in March 2014; de Blasio, who had backed
off previous campaign promises to expand the Act to apply to more workers, recently signed an
executive order expanding the Act. Andrew J. Hawkins, Mayor to Tenants at City-Backed
Projects: Pay Up, CRAIN’S: INSIDER (Sept. 30, 2014), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/
20140930/BLOGS04/140939987/mayor-to-tenants-at-city-backed-projects-pay-up; Rachel L.
Swarns, Silence from de Blasio on Expansion of Living Wage Law, N.Y. TIMES (July 6, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/07/nyregion/silence-from-bill-de-blasio-on-living-wagelaw.html?_r=0.
72 Been, supra note 8, at 18.
73 Fazio & Wallace, supra note 1, at 543. In 2008, one article provided a comprehensive
national survey of CBAs in Los Angeles, San Diego, San Jose, Oakland, New York, New Haven
(Connecticut), Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Denver, Pittsburgh, Washington, D.C., Camden (New
Jersey), New Orleans, and elsewhere. See Patricia E. Salkin & Amy Lavine, Negotiating for Social
Justice and the Promise of Community Benefits Agreements: Case Studies of Current and
Developing Agreements, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING & COMMUNITY DEV. L. 113 (2008).
74 Musil, supra note 20, at 837.
75 Id. at 846.
76 Id.
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the scholarly, which often focus on instances involving state action. This
Section highlights major concerns with CBAs in the literature.
1.

Claims of Extortion by Community Groups

One of the harshest rhetorical criticisms of CBAs came from
former New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg. Despite signing a
2005 CBA related to the development of the Barclays Arena at Atlantic
Yards 77 as a witness, Mayor Bloomberg’s opinion changed as of 2009
when he referred to CBAs simply as a “small group of
people . . . feather[ing] their own nests, extort[ing] money from the
developer.” 78 Bloomberg’s position was further clarified by then
president of the New York City Economic Development Corporation,
Seth Pinsky, who indicated that the objection was to the private nature
of CBAs as functioning outside the political process, preventing elected
officials from ensuring “communities get the benefits that they need.” 79
The critique of CBAs as outside the political process, and therefore
beyond control of duly elected representatives of the people, is perhaps
the most harming. Since community groups themselves are unelected
their motives can be called into question. 80 This Article will assess this
argument in greater detail in Part III.
2.

Lack of Representativeness

Perhaps related to the extortion argument is the fact that
occasionally, CBA coalitions do not represent community interests.
Since CBA coalition negotiators are not elected, 81 community members
have limited established mechanisms—save going to the press or
77 Now termed “Pacific Park Brooklyn.” Pacific Park Brooklyn, FORESTCITY, http://
www.forestcity.net/properties/mixed_use/property_listing/Pages/Pacific_park_brooklyn.aspx
(last visited July 24, 2015).
78 Mike McLaughlin, Bloomy Still Wants Gehry—Plus Other Tidbits from the Mayor in Our
Endorsement Sit-Down, BROOKLYN PAPER (Aug. 25, 2009), http://www.brooklynpaper.com/
stories/32/34/32_34_mm_bloomberg_in_our_office.html (quoting Michael Bloomberg).
79 Norman Oder, On Brian Lehrer Show, NYC EDC’S Pinsky Avoids AY CBA Discussion,
Misrepresents Railyard, and Claims He Lives “a Few Blocks” from the Site, ATLANTIC
YARDS/PACIFIC PARK REP. (Jan. 12, 2010, 2:53 AM), http://atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/
2010/01/on-brian-lehrer-show-nyc-edcs-pinsky.html (quoting Seth Pinsky).
80 In the Atlantic Yards CBA, for instance, the signatory groups had a direct financial
interest in the CBA moving forward. Amy Lavine & Norman Oder, Urban Redevelopment
Policy, Judicial Deference to Unaccountable Agencies, and Reality in Brooklyn’s Atlantic Yards
Project, 42 URB. LAW. 287, 316 (2010).
81 GROSS WITH LEROY & JANIS-APARICIO, supra note 4, at 11; Been, supra note 8, at 21.
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leveraging their own political power—for holding negotiators
accountable for the outcomes of CBA negotiations, or for negotiators’
conduct during the negotiation. 82
3.

Corruption by Elected Officials and Impermissible State Action

When private CBA negotiations impact public approvals, there are
many opportunities for impermissible state action—and worse. 83
Political decisions are rife with opportunities for self-dealing.
Government decisions, including those related to land use, are often
corrupted by insider deals. 84
CBAs are susceptible to government involvement when elected
officials or government agents attempt to enter into CBAs as parties.
Even if not acting as parties, government officials can use their power
and office to steer lucrative benefits to nonprofits that they direct or
control, often via family members or supporters. 85 Directing benefits to
particular groups favored by government officials is contrary to the
transparent and inclusive nature of CBAs.
With government involvement comes the legal doctrinal trappings
of state action. Although the “essential nexus” 86 and “rough
proportionality”87 tests may not directly apply to CBAs as private
agreements, CBAs are seen against the backdrop of Supreme Court
Been, supra note 8, at 21–22.
Further examples include when governments pass legislation supporting or opposing
certain community benefits, or adopting their own CBA without community input. See, e.g.,
Ted Phillips, Hempstead Residents Rally Against Downtown Redevelopment, NEWSDAY (Apr. 18,
2015, 9:49 PM), http://www.newsday.com/long-island/nassau/hempstead-residents-rallyagainst-downtown-renaissance-1.10294356?pts=915712.
84 This becomes evident when entrenched factions are brought down with indictments and
the political landscape shifts. Nick Reisman, Corruption Probes Hamper Deal Making, DeFran
Says, ST. POL. (June 8, 2015, 2:56 PM), http://www.nystateofpolitics.com/2015/06/corruptionprobes-hamper-deal-making-defran-says. In one instance, a “secret benefits agreement” was
reportedly negotiated around the development of the Gateway II shopping complex in the East
New York neighborhood. Erin Durkin & Jake Pearson, Charles Barron Backs Brooklyn Complex
After Developer Vows Cash for Ex-Aide’s ‘Confidential’ Plan, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 7, 2011,
4:00
AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/politics/charles-barron-backs-brooklyncomplex-developer-vows-cash-ex-aide-confidential-plan-article-1.160819. Allegedly, a former
aide of a city councilmember was the sole signer of an agreement that was not made public,
which provided a cash payout to a coalition represented by a single negotiator. Id.
85 See, e.g., Durkin & Pearson, supra note 84.
86 See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (holding that there must be an
essential nexus between conditions the government imposes during a land use approval and the
proposed development).
87 See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (holding the impact of a proposed
development must be roughly proportional to the government’s conditions set for a specific
land use approval).
82
83
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jurisprudence regulating negotiations over land use approvals. 88 This
Article will revisit state action in Part III by assessing the success of CBA
negotiations in avoiding government interference.
F.

CBA Campaigns Shape Major Economic Development Projects
1.

Detroit City Council Considers CBA Ordinance

In Detroit, the City Council considered an ordinance that would
have required CBAs between community groups and developers for
development projects estimated to cost over fifteen million dollars in
public or private funds, receiving public land, or receiving cumulative
tax abatements over three hundred thousand dollars. 89 Such CBAs
would have been a requirement for a project receiving public approval. 90
First-source hiring programs, a mechanism to recruit and train local
workers for construction and operations job, would have been required
for projects under three million dollars. 91
The proposed Detroit bill borrowed largely from recommendations
made in the literature, and from two reports released in New York City
in 2010. 92 First, the bill required developers to negotiate with the “Host
Community,” defined as residents within the census tract where the
development is located, or in adjacent census tracks. 93 As some have
correctly observed, when developers approach communities as equals,
there is the potential for a win-win scenario. 94
The bill also follows in part the recommendations of a 2010 report
by the New York City Bar’s Land Use Committee, in which the authors
recommended that city officials consider CBAs only in economic
development projects, and not in land use approvals. 95 The Land Use
Committee argued that, were government to consider CBAs in the land
use process, it might run afoul of constitutional protections afforded

Been, supra note 8, at 14–15.
See READ! The Current Draft CBA Ordinance, EQUITABLE DETROIT COALITION, http://
www.equitabledetroit.org/read-the-current-draft-cba-ordinance (last visited Apr. 22, 2016).
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 See infra notes 94–98 and accompanying text.
93 READ! The Current Draft CBA Ordinance, supra note 89.
94 See, e.g., DLA Piper Press Release, supra note 18.
95 See LAND USE COMM., ASS’N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., THE ROLE OF
COMMUNITY BENEFIT AGREEMENTS IN NEW YORK CITY’S LAND USE PROCESS 47–48 (2010),
http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20071844-TheRoleofCommunityBenefit
AgreementsinNYCLandUseProcess.pdf.
88
89
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developers. 96 The Detroit ordinance, as was proposed, suggested that
CBAs be considered in economic development projects, or in projects
involving land disposition. 97
Following the NYC Bar report, NYC Comptroller John C. Liu
commissioned his own report, which advocated “public benefit
agreements” in both land use approvals and in economic development
projects (1) with footprints greater than five hundred thousand square
feet, and (2) receiving in excess of seventy-five million dollars. 98 The
comptroller’s report recommended that public benefits commitments be
included in public approvals and enforceable by the city and its
economic development agency. 99 This is in contrast to the proposed
Detroit ordinance that would have kept CBAs enforceable by the
community groups that are parties to the agreement. 100 Importantly, the
proposed ordinance was limited in that developers would not have been
required to sign a CBA, but only to engage with the community for a
CBA negotiation. 101 Nevertheless, the proposed ordinance was not
supported by all Detroiters.
Rodrick Miller, president and CEO of the Detroit Economic
Growth Corporation has argued that requiring CBAs only raises
barriers to attracting new businesses to the city. 102 This is consistent
with the two primary arguments against the ordinance: First, that
requiring developers to enter into a CBA will discourage them from
building in Detroit. And second, that the city’s challenges are best solved
by economic growth. 103 But critics of these arguments claim that CBAs
are critical in sharing benefits that were missed during the development

96 Id. at 46–48; see also Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
97 READ! The Current Draft CBA Ordinance, supra note 89.
98 TASK FORCE ON PUBLIC BENEFIT AGREEMENTS, supra note 65.
99 Id.
100 READ! The Current Draft CBA Ordinance, supra note 89.
101 DAVID WHITAKER, LEGISLATIVE POLICY DIV., CITY COUNCIL, CITY OF DETROIT,
COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS POLICY DEBATE (2014), http://www.detroitmi.gov/Portals/
0/docs/Legislative%20Policy%20Reports/2014/Community%20Benefits%20Agreement%201014-14_1.pdf?ver=2014-10-15-145656-547.
102 Ryan Felton, Report: Community Benefits Ordinance Not ‘Absolute Requirement’ for
Development to Sign Agreement, DETROIT METRO TIMES: NEWS HITS (Oct. 17, 2014, 1:23 PM),
http://www.metrotimes.com/Blogs/archives/2014/10/17/report-community-benefitsordinance-not-absolute-requirement-for-development-to-sign-agreement.
103 See, e.g., Eli Day, Opinion, Community Benefits Agreements Make Economic Sense,
DETROIT NEWS (Apr. 30, 2015, 12:08 AM), http://www.detroitnews.com/story/opinion/2015/
04/30/day-community-benefits-agreements/26595573.
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of the Detroit Red Wings arena 104 and the international bridge crossing
into Canada. 105
While city council members in Detroit considered the merits of the
proposed legislation, lawmakers in the Michigan state legislature
preemptively prohibited aspects of the ordinance that raised wages for
workers. In particular, the Michigan legislature recently passed, and the
governor approved, the controversial House Bill No. 4052, known as the
Local Government Labor Regulatory Limitation Act. 106 The Act
prohibits local governments from enacting a wage ordinance (such as a
living wage law) that exceeds the minimum wage in Michigan. 107 Of
course, the legislature cannot prevent a CBA coalition and a private
developer from agreeing to a living wage at a particular site.
Nevertheless, requiring state approval for a living wage ordinance is
clearly designed to stop the movement to a fifteen dollars per hour
minimum wage, which has recently been passed in Los Angeles, Seattle,
and other cities. 108
2.

New Atlanta Falcons Stadium Rises Despite CBA Campaign

When construction of the Georgia Dome was completed in 1992, it
was the largest domed stadium in the world. 109 It cost $214 million to
build, 110 is owned by the State of Georgia, and has hosted home games
for the National Football League’s (NFL) Atlanta Falcons, the National
Basketball Association’s (NBA) Atlanta Hawks for a time, the Georgia
State Panthers, the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s (NCAA)
Football Chick-fil-A Peach Bowl, and the Southeastern Conference
Football Championship.111 In 2010, the Georgia World Congress
Center, the stadium’s operator, released a study that it commissioned in

104 See, e.g., Ryan Felton, The Unexpected Politician: Raquel Castañeda-López, DETROIT
METRO TIMES (June 10, 2015), http://www.metrotimes.com/detroit/the-unexpected-politicianraquel-castaandntildeeda-landoacutepez/Content?oid=2349311.
105 See, e.g., Alexis Stephens, Detroit Is Taking the Lead in the Community Benefits
Movement, NEXT CITY (Mar. 10, 2015), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/detroit-communitybenefits-agreement.
106 H.R. 4052, 98th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2015).
107 Id.
108 For news about the fifteen dollar per hour minimum wage campaign, see Latest News,
15NOW.ORG, https://15now.org/latest-news (last visited Aug. 11, 2015).
109 About the Georgia Dome, GA. DOME, http://gadome.com/about/Default.aspx (last visited
Mar. 3, 2016).
110 Georgia
Dome,
PBS,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/buildingbig/wonder/structure/
georgia.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2016).
111 About the Georgia Dome, supra note 109.
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order to build a new stadium to replace the Georgia Dome. 112 The
Falcons management expressed a preference for a new stadium versus
renovating the Georgia Dome. 113
In March 2013, the Atlanta City Council approved $200 million in
tax exempt stadium construction bonds for the project, paid for by hotel
and motel taxes, plus an undefined hundreds of millions more to defray
maintenance and operations through 2050. 114 In May 2013, the NFL
agreed to loan $200 million for stadium construction. 115 Architectural
plans for the new stadium include room for around 70,000 seats, 180
luxury suites, and 7500 club seats, at an estimated cost of $1 billion. 116
In June 2013, Common Cause Georgia attempted to gain the
35,000 signatures necessary under the Atlanta City Charter to bring a
ballot question of whether or not to back the $1 billion dollar project.
They were unsuccessful in the petition drive. 117
In March 2014, a local church was demolished to make way for the
new stadium construction. 118 In May 2014, there was groundbreaking
on the new site. 119 By January 2015, it was announced that the new
stadium would have a digital screen three times larger than any existing
single board display in the NFL. 120 It would have a 100-yard bar and a
circular roof opening inspired by the Roman Pantheon. 121 Public
112 POPULOUS, GWCC: MASTER PLAN PHASE II—STADIUM SOLUTIONS: FINAL REPORT
(2010), http://www.gwcc.com/about/stadium/Reports/Master%20Plans/mpreport2.pdf.
113 Tim Tucker, Fans Pay the Price for New Stadiums, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (May 27, 2012,
4:49 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/local/fans-pay-the-price-for-new-stadiums/nQT7T.
114 CITY OF ATLANTA, NSP FINANCING PROPOSAL: PROPOSED NEW STADIUM PROJECT AND
HOTEL/MOTEL
TAX
(2013),
http://www.atlantaga.gov/modules/showdocument.aspx?
documentid=7191.
115 NFL Grants $200 Million Loan for New Atlanta Falcons Stadium, NAT’L FOOTBALL
LEAGUE (May 21, 2013, 1:07 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap1000000204938/article/
nfl-grants-200-million-loan-for-new-atlanta-falcons-stadium.
116 Mercedes-Benz Stadium, STADIUMS PRO FOOTBALL, http://stadiumsofprofootball.com/
future/MercedesBenzStadium.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2016).
117 Jim Galloway, Common Cause Concedes Defeat in Petition Drive to Stop Falcons Stadium,
ATLANTA J.-CONST.: POL. INSIDER (Aug. 8, 2013, 4:20 PM), http://www.ajc.com/weblogs/
political-insider/2013/aug/08/common-cause-concedes-defeat-petition-drive-stop-f.
118 Michelle E. Shaw, First of Two Churches Demolished for New Falcons Stadium, ATLANTA
J.-CONST. (Apr. 24, 2014, 6:42 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/first-of-two-churchesdemolished-for-new-falcons-s/nfhJf.
119 Tim Tucker, At Stadium Groundbreaking, Blank Lobbies for a Super Bowl, ATLANTA J.CONST. (May 19, 2014, 11:07 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/sports/football/at-stadiumgroundbreaking-blank-lobbies-for-a-supe/nfzg3.
120 Tim Tucker, Falcons Hire Firm to Build NFL’s Largest Video Board, ATLANTA J.-CONST.
(Jan. 30, 2015, 5:15 PM), http://www.ajc.com/news/sports/football/falcons-hire-firm-to-buildnfls-largest-video-boar/nj2DH.
121 Marissa Payne, Check Out the Atlanta Falcons’ New, Ridiculously Cool Stadium, WASH.
POST (Jan. 13, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2015/01/13/checkout-the-atlanta-falcons-new-ridiculously-cool-stadium.
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financing commitments were increased to $554 million. 122 Personal seat
licenses were offered for sale at up to $45,000. 123 The Chick-fil-A Peach
Bowl has already said it will bid to host the College Football Playoff once
the stadium is built, and the 2020 NCAA Men’s Basketball Final Four is
already scheduled to take place at the stadium. 124
In summary, the city and state made an almost $600 million public
financing commitment for construction, and undetermined sums for
maintenance and operations for the next thirty years. Yet nowhere is
there an enforceable agreement stating how the money will be spent,
and whether any of the procurement, jobs, or revenue will benefit local
residents. Indeed the one effort to put the question of whether to
publically finance the stadium to a public vote was abandoned. 125 Had
there been a CBA negotiation, one might conjecture, it may have looked
like one of the CBA negotiations that resulted in binding agreements.
II. THE 2013 KINGSBRIDGE NATIONAL ICE CENTER CBA: ANALYSIS AND
LESSONS LEARNED
Following in large part the strategies discussed above and
implemented by organizers in Atlanta, Chicago, and elsewhere, the
Kingsbridge Armory Redevelopment Alliance, staffed at the time by the
Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition (NWBCCC), 126
waged a CBA campaign that led to a binding agreement around the
$345 million renovation of a building that takes up three city blocks and
could house nearly two football fields side-by-side. 127 The 2013
122 Neil deMause, Falcons Stadium Cost to Taxpayers, Counting Hidden Subsidies: $554
Million, FIELD SCHEMES (Mar. 18, 2013), http://www.fieldofschemes.com/2013/03/18/4735/
falcons-stadium-cost-to-taxpayers-counting-hidden-subsidies-554-million.
123 Doug Richards, Falcons: Seat Licenses Start at $500, Up to $45,000, 11 ALIVE (June 2,
2015, 5:55 PM), http://www.11alive.com/story/news/local/downtown/2015/06/02/falcons-seatlicenses/28372491.
124 Atlanta Selected to Host 2018 College Football Playoff National Championship, CHICKFIL-A PEACH BOWL (Nov. 4, 2015), http://www.chick-fil-apeachbowl.com/2015/11/04/2018ncg;
New Atlanta Stadium to Host 2020 NCAA Final Four, MERCEDES-BENZ STADIUM (Nov. 14,
2014), http://mercedesbenzstadium.com/2014/11/14/new-atlanta-stadium-to-host-2020-ncaafinal-four.
125 Galloway, supra note 118.
126 NWBCCC was incorporated as a New York not-for-profit corporation in August 1974.
Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition, Inc., N.Y. ST. DEP’T ST., https://
appext20.dos.ny.gov/corp_public/CORPSEARCH.ENTITY_INFORMATION?p_nameid=
407037&p_corpid=349067&p_entity_name=Northwest%20Bronx%20Community%20and%
20Clergy%20Coalition&p_name_type=A&p_search_type=BEGINS&p_srch_results_page=0
(last visited Apr. 22, 2016).
127 Laura Flanders, After 20-Year Fight, Bronx Community Wins Big on Development Project
Committed to Living Wages and Local Economy, YES! MAG. (Jan. 3, 2014), http://
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Kingsbridge National Ice Center (KNIC) CBA can be viewed from the
perspective of a variety of interest groups, including community
organizers, developers, government officials, and private citizens. This
Part poses and discusses several key questions, including: Who gets to
negotiate CBAs? What is the appropriate value of the benefits agreed to?
And are community groups the best parties to be negotiating CBAs with
developers?
This Part presents examples of how successful CBA negotiations
and campaigns happen, focusing on the Kingsbridge Armory example,
while alluding to others. The KNIC CBA involved many of the issues
discussed above regarding co-option by government, and the CBA is
still being implemented. Nevertheless, it can serve as an important guide
to future CBA negotiations. Thus far, a study of the KNIC CBA is
missing from the legal academic literature. This Article fills that gap.
A.

The KNIC CBA

Located in the Kingsbridge neighborhood of the Bronx, 128 the
Kingsbridge Armory 129 is part of a revival movement of armory
construction in New York City. 130 The armory became city owned in the

www.yesmagazine.org/commonomics/kingsbridge-armory-community-benefits-agreement
(stating that the Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition founded Kingsbridge
Armory Redevelopment Alliance); Zoe Rosenberg, See Inside the Colossal Abandoned
Kingsbridge Armory, CURBED N.Y. (June 9, 2015, 3:10 PM), http://ny.curbed.com/2015/6/9/
9951688/see-inside-the-colossal-abandoned-kingsbridge-armory (stating that the project was
estimated at $345 million, covers nearly three city blocks, and the drill floor is the size of two
football fields).
128 The Bronx derives its name from Jonas Bronck, of Danish ancestry, who arrived in the
area in 1639. See Jared Tobin Finkelstein, Commentary, In re Brett: The Sticky Problem of
Statutory Construction, 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 430, 430 n.3 (1983) (citing 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA
AMERICANA 599 (1968 ed.)).
129 Officially the home of the 258th Field Artillery (Eighth Regiment), the Kingsbridge
Armory was designated a landmark site on September 24, 1974, by the New York City
Landmarks Preservation Commission. The Commission describes the armory as having been
built over a five-year period, from 1912 to 1917, and designed by the firm Pilcher & Tachau,
which also designed the Troop C Armory at 1579 Bedford Avenue in the Crown Heights
neighborhood of Brooklyn in 1901. “[O]ne of the few remaining armories in New York
City, . . . it gives the appearance of a medieval Romanesque-style fortress with its massive
towers and crenellated parapets . . . .” LANDMARKS PRES. COMM’N, N.Y.C., KINGSBRIDGE
ARMORY
(EIGHT
REGIMENT
ARMORY)
(1974),
http://
www.neighborhoodpreservationcenter.org/db/bb_files/74-KINGSBRIDGE-ARMORY.pdf. In
1974, the Landmarks Preservation Commission regarded it as the largest armory in the world.
Id.
130 Robert Koch, The Medieval Castle Revival: New York Armories, J. SOC’Y ARCHITECTURAL
HISTORIANS, Oct. 1955, at 23.

DE BARBIERI.37.5.3 (Do Not Delete)

2016]

COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS

6/6/2016 2:58 PM

1797

1990s and sat vacant for years. 131 This Section discusses two attempts to
redevelop the armory. It highlights the KNIC CBA reached between the
Kingsbridge National Ice Center Partners and a broad-based
community coalition led by the Kingsbridge Armory Redevelopment
Alliance (KARA), a community organizing group. The case study
analyzes the KNIC CBA negotiation process, the substance of the
agreement, and draws lessons from both that can help build a legal
framework for assessing the usefulness of CBAs in land use approvals.
1.

Kingsbridge Armory Redevelopment Alliance

NWBCCC is a grassroots organizing group known for its Saul
Alinsky-modeled community organizing methodology. 132 “Organizing”
for Alinsky means three general principles: winning immediate
improvements in people’s lives, giving people a sense of their own
power and altering the relations of power. 133 NWBCCC brought this
organizing approach to the redevelopment of the Kingsbridge Armory
when it launched KARA. 134
KARA is the first truly inclusive grassroots CBA coalition in New
York City. 135 The KARA campaign to shape the development of the
Armory had initially started around 1997 after the city of New York
took ownership of the building. 136 KARA’s activities included outreach
131 Following the announcement of the redevelopment of the armory in 2013, Mayor
Michael Bloomberg said: “What is now an abandoned structure will soon become the world’s
largest indoor ice rink facility . . . and it will serve as yet another example of our
administration’s commitment to turning what were once symbols of New York City’s
decline . . . into community treasures and international attractions.” Winnie Hu, City Council
Approves an Ice Center for the Bronx, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/
2013/12/11/nyregion/city-council-approves-an-ice-center-for-the-bronx.html?_r=0
(quoting
Mayor Bloomberg).
132 Julissa Reynoso, The Impact of Identity Politics and Public Sector Reform on Organizing
and the Practice of Democracy, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 149, 150 (2005). Since the 1940s,
community organizing has been linked with Saul Alinsky. Id. at 153 (citing Scott L. Cummings
& Ingrid V. Eagly, A Critical Reflection on Law and Organizing, 48 UCLA L. REV. 443, 461
(2001)).
133 Id. at 153 (citing KIMBERLEY A. BOBO ET AL., ORGANIZING FOR SOCIAL CHANGE:
MIDWEST ACADEMY MANUAL FOR ACTIVISTS 11–12 (3d ed. 2001)).
134 Telephone Interview with Alice McIntosh, Lead Negotiator, Kingsbridge Armory
Redevelopment All. (Dec. 18, 2014). “NWBCCC . . . collaborated with the United Federation of
Teachers (UFT); the Retail, Wholesale, and Department Store Employees Union (RWDSU);
and the Carpenters and the Laborers Union to start an Armory Committee to” present the
community’s ideas for renovation of the Armory. Reynoso, supra note 132, at 182 n.191 (citing
NW. BRONX CMTY. & CLERGY COAL., FINAL REPORT TO THE ROCKEFELLER BROTHERS FUND 13
(2002) (on file with author)).
135 Salkin & Lavine, Balancing Community Empowerment, supra note 19, at 210.
136 Telephone Interview with Alice McIntosh, supra note 134.
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to congregations in the neighborhoods surrounding the armory, as well
as direct actions, such as candlelight vigils, protests, and direct meetings
with city officials. 137
2.

The Related Companies’ Failed CBA Attempt

In 2008, the city selected The Related Companies to redevelop the
Armory into a $310 million retail mall, including shops, restaurants, and
a movie theater. 138 Following selection, KARA demanded The Related
Companies agree to a CBA prior to final approval of the project by the
City Council. 139 Then Mayor Michael Bloomberg and then president of
the city’s Economic Development Corporation publically opposed
KARA’s demand. 140
One of the more divisive terms among the community coalition
was the proposal to exclude a grocery store from the proposed
development. 141 KARA sought to block a supermarket or grocery store
in the project plan, while the chairman of the local Community Board 142
asked that the project include a grocery store. 143
Id.
LAND USE COMM., supra note 95, at 22; Terry Pristin, Bronx Groups Demand a Voice in a
Landmark’s Revival, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2008, at C6.
139 Bill Egbert, Coalition Battles Kingsbridge Armory Developer over Community Benefits,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Apr. 24, 2008, 11:24 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/
coalition-battles-kingsbridge-armory-developer-community-benefits-article-1.279649
(“The
Kingsbridge Armory was built to serve and protect our community . . . . Let’s make it a beacon
of hope once again.”(quoting Desiree Pilgrim-Hunter, one of the leaders of KARA)); Pristin,
supra note 138.
140 Terry Pristin, Proposed Supermarket Divides Bronx Community, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30,
2009, at B6; Daniel Beekman, Bloomberg Sits Down with CNG, BRONX TIMES (Aug. 27, 2009),
http://www.bxtimes.com/stories/2009/35/doc4a96911003b49524387239.html.
141 Salkin & Lavine, Balancing Community Empowerment, supra note 19, at 210 (pointing
out that some members of the KARA coalition did not want a grocery store included in the
development, while others felt that a grocery store was a necessary service that the
neighborhood was lacking). Subsequently, a family-owned, Bronx-based company opened an
approximately 10,000 square foot grocery store with an entrance across the street from the
armory site. See Our Locations, MORTON WILLIAMS, http://www.mortonwilliams.com/#!ourlocationa/c1sa7 (last visited Aug. 5, 2015) (listing a 15 E. Kingsbridge Road location in the
Bronx).
142 Community boards in New York City have an advisory role in land use decisions under
the City’s Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP). See N.Y.C., N.Y., CHARTER ch. 8,
§ 197-a (2015). Borough presidents also have an advisory role; the City Planning Commission
has a vote; and ultimately, the City Council decides whether or not a project will proceed.
Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP), N.Y.C. DEP’T CITY PLAN., http://
www1.nyc.gov/site/planning/applicants/applicant-portal/step5-ulurp-process.page (last visited
July 25, 2015) (illustrating the ULURP process).
143 Terry Pristin, Proposed Supermarket Divides Bronx Community, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30,
2009, at B6.
137
138
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The wages that tenants at the project would be required to pay their
employees was a divisive issue, not amongst the coalition members, but
between the coalition and the developer. KARA, Bronx Borough
President Ruben Diaz Jr., and others called for a “living wage” to be paid
to all employees at the redeveloped armory. 144 Jesse Masyr, attorney for
The Related Companies, called the living wage proposal a deal killer. 145
On December 14, 2009 the City Council voted down the project
proposal of The Related Companies. 146 This was the first time in the
twelve years of the Bloomberg Administration that the Council rejected
a Uniform Land Use Review Procedure (ULURP) proposal. 147 The
Council went on to pass the Fair Wages for New Yorkers Act, over
Bloomberg’s veto, requiring a higher living wage be paid for projects
receiving subsidies from the City. 148 New York City Mayor de Blasio has
increased the living wage in the legislation to the symbolic $13.13 per
hour 149 by executive order. 150

144 Bill Egbert, Bronx Leaders Demand Living Wage at Kingsbridge Armory Development
Even if it Scuttles Deal, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 27, 2009, 1:53 AM), http://
www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/bronx-leaders-demand-living-wage-kingsbridgearmory-development-scuttles-deal-article-1.399130.
145 Sam Dolnick, Planners Accept Proposal for Mall at Bronx Armory, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20,
2009, at A28 (“We’re opposed to imposing an economic penalty to tenants that come to our site
that doesn’t exist literally across the street or anywhere else in New York City.” (quoting Jesse
Masyr)).
146 Sewell Chan, Council Spurns Plan to Turn Kingsbridge Armory into Mall, N.Y. TIMES:
CITY ROOM (Dec. 15, 2009, 8:54 AM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/15/councilspurns-plan-to-turn-kingsbridge-armory-into-mall. For a discussion on KARA persuading the
Council to vote no on the project as a success of the checks and balances of the City Charter,
see Michael A. Cardozo, Reflections on the 1989 Charter Revisions, 58 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 85, 89
(2014).
147 Sally Goldenberg, A Bronx Bummer, N.Y. POST (Dec. 15, 2009, 5:00 AM), http://
nypost.com/2009/12/15/a-bronx-bummer (discussing the blow to Bloomberg in halting one of
his hoped for projects, as well as Bronx Borough President Ruben Diaz Jr.’s push for a ten
dollar per hour minimum wage plus benefits). Diaz Jr.’s position at the time was the idea “that
any job is better than no job no longer applies.” Id. (quoting Diaz Jr.). Masyr stated that “the
council ‘voted no to over 2,000 jobs,’” and questioned the Council’s rationale since the
Council’s Land Use Committee based its no vote on traffic and parking concerns. Id.
148 See N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE tit. 6, § 6-134 (2015); see also supra note 71.
149 Perhaps this mirrors President Obama’s minimum wage raise for federal contractors to
$10.10 per hour. See Ben Wolfgang, Because He Says So: Acting Alone, Obama Boosts Minimum
Wage for Contractors, WASH. TIMES (Feb. 12, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/
2014/feb/12/obama-raise-minimum-wage-1010-hour-federal-contrac.
150 Matt Flegenheimer, De Blasio’s Executive Order Will Expand Living Wage Law to
Thousands More, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 29, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/30/nyregion/
de-blasio-to-sign-executive-order-significantly-expanding-living-wage-law.html.
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A Successful CBA for the Kingsbridge National Ice Center

Following the defeat of the 2009 proposal, Diaz Jr. and Council
Member Fernando Cabrera cochaired a task force to study
redevelopment models for the armory. 151 Desirée Pilgrim-Hunter,
President of NWBCCC, was a member of the committee working on
this report, along with Majora Carter, newly elected State Senator
Gustavo Rivera, Community Board Chair Paul Foster, and Partnership
for New York City President Kathy Wylde. The task force report, issued
in June 2011, studied three uses for the armory: sports, wellness, and
entertainment center; sustainable food industry; and film studio. 152
On January 12, 2012, the New York City Economic Development
Corporation released a new request for proposals (RFP) to redevelop the
armory. 153 The RFP took many of the task force report
recommendations into account. It encouraged developers to submit
proposals for recreation, community facility, and entertainment uses, as
well as commercial and retail uses, while discouraging residential and
big-box store uses. 154 The RFP also stated it would view favorably
proposals that maximized jobs falling under Local Law 38 of 2002,
which requires contractors and subcontractors doing business with the
city to pay employees at least ten dollars per hour with health benefits,
or $11.50 per hour without health benefits. 155
151 KINGSBRIDGE ARMORY TASK FORCE, KINGSBRIDGE ARMORY TASK FORCE REPORT (2011),
http://bronxboropres.nyc.gov/pdf/Kingsbridge-Armory-Task-Force-Report.pdf.
152 Id. (specifying a hockey rink and other uses, such as a field house, in the section on
sports, wellness, and entertainment).
153 City Renews Efforts to Redevelop Kingsbridge Armory, supra note 71; see also N.Y.C.
ECON. DEV. CORP., REQUEST FOR PROPOSALS: KINGSBRIDGE ARMORY (2012), https://
www.scribd.com/doc/85645468/Kingsbridge-Armory-Request-For-Proposals-2011-FF-1-11-12.
In contrast to the 2006 RFP, which The Related Companies had responded to and had been
selected from, this RFP entertained options to lease, as well as to purchase, the site. City Renews
Efforts to Redevelop Kingsbridge Armory, supra note 71.
154 City Renews Efforts to Redevelop Kingsbridge Armory, supra note 71.
155 Local Law 38 of 2002 is an early living wage law passed by Mayor Bloomberg that
extended a living wage primarily to home healthcare and childcare workers employed by
agencies with city contracts. Press Release, Brennan Ctr. for Justice, Mayor Bloomberg Signs
New York City Living Wage Law (Nov. 27, 2002), https://www.brennancenter.org/press-release/
mayor-bloomberg-signs-new-york-city-living-wage-law; see also File No. Int 0066-2002, N.Y.C.
COUNCIL,
http://legistar.council.nyc.gov/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=437415&GUID=
621101D0-2EBF-468B-9E13-DF9AFBDA66BB&Options=ID|Text|&Search=2002%2f038 (last
visited May 11, 2016). The New York City Council has expanded the living wage law over the
past decade into what is now called the Fair Wages for New Yorkers Act, which was enacted
June 28, 2012. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMINISTRATIVE CODE tit. 6, § 6-134 (2015); see also supra note
71. As this article goes to publication, the future of the Kingsbridge National Ice Center project
is uncertain, as the KNIC team and the New York City Economic Development Corporation
are engaged in an open dispute about whether KNIC satisfied the conditions to receive its lease
to the armory. Charles V. Bagli, Bronx Ice Center Plan Hangs in the Balance, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.

DE BARBIERI.37.5.3 (Do Not Delete)

2016]

COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS

6/6/2016 2:58 PM

1801

A group led by National Hockey League all-star Mark Messier
proposed to build nine ice rinks inside the Kingsbridge Armory to be
called the Kingsbridge National Ice Center. 156 The proposal reflected
many of the terms in the RFP, including living wage jobs, a general local
hiring provision, and green building practices. 157 The KNIC team also
began an aggressive, targeted, media and outreach effort, which
included obtaining the endorsement of Diaz Jr., 158 as well as courting
KARA leadership. 159
KARA formed a partnership with Bronx Community Board 7 in
advocating for a CBA. 160 KARA and the developer, led by Kevin
Parker 161 met on January 29, 2013, to discuss terms in a possible CBA. 162
10, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/11/nyregion/bronx-ice-center-plan-hangs-in-thebalance.html?_r=0.
156 Matt Chaban, How Exactly Do You Cram Nine Ice Rinks into a 95-Year-Old Armory,
Even One as Big as Kingsbridge, OBSERVER (Aug. 8, 2012, 2:40 PM), http://observer.com/2012/
08/how-exactly-do-you-cram-nine-ice-rinks-into-a-95-year-old-armory-even-one-as-big-askingsbridge; see also Redevelopment of Kingsbridge Armory, NW. BRONX COMMUNITY &
CLERGY COALITION, http://northwestbronx.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/CooperationAgreement-Kingsbridge-Armory-CBA.pdf (last visited Mar. 4, 2016) [hereinafter KNIC CBA].
157 KNIC CBA, supra note 156.
158 Chaban, supra note 156; Winnie Hu, Ice Center with 9 Rinks Is Proposed for Bronx
Armory, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/08/24/nyregion/ice-centerproposed-for-kingsbridge-armory.html?_r=0.
159 Telephone Interview with Alice McIntosh, supra note 134. KNIC and KARA leaders even
toured the Ed Snider Foundation ice sports program in Philadelphia. Id. Ed Snider is chairman
of Comcast Spectacor, which owns the Philadelphia Flyers National Hockey League Team, and
other companies, including Global Spectrum, which manages events facilities. Founder, SNIDER
HOCKEY, http://sniderhockey.com/who-we-are/founder (last visited Apr. 11, 2016).
160 Community Board 7 and Kingsbridge Armory Redevelopment Alliance Partner to
Negotiate Community Benefits Agreement, NORWOOD NEWS (Dec. 20, 2012) [hereinafter
NORWOOD NEWS], http://www.norwoodnews.org/id=10014&story=community-board-7-andkingsbridge-armory-redevelopment-alliance-partner-to-negotiate-community-benefitsagreement (reporting that the community board and KARA released a joint statement sharing
their goals that an enforceable CBA is signed and that the community’s priorities are contained
in the lease signed with the city).
161 In October 2014, a judge in the Bronx ruled that Kevin E. Parker is the sole member of
the Kingsbridge National Ice Center LLC—the entity that was selected to redevelop the
armory—and could continue to negotiate a lease with the City of New York. David Cruz, Judge:
KNIC Project Can Proceed, NORWOOD NEWS (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.norwoodnews.org/id=
15916&story=judge-knic-project-can-proceed. Mark Messier, National Hockey League all-star
and former New York Ranger, also participated in the discussion. Mike Sielski, ‘The Captain’
Quits the Rangers, WALL ST. J. (June 27, 2013, 8:42 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB1000
1424127887323873904578571902630546868. Messier, who had sought the Rangers’ coaching
position, left the organization in June 2013 to assist in the development of KNIC and to expand
the game of hockey in the New York area. Id. Sarah Hughes, Olympic figure skater, also
participated in the discussion. Neil Best, Sarah Hughes Developing World’s Largest Indoor Ice
Rink in the Bronx, NEWSDAY (Feb. 13, 2014, 12:55 PM), http://www.newsday.com/sports/
olympics/sarah-hughes-developing-world-s-largest-indoor-ice-rink-in-the-bronx-1.7059462.
162 David Cruz, CBA Talks for Kingsbridge Armory Bid Underway, BRONX TIMES (Jan. 31,
2013), http://www.bxtimes.com/stories/2013/5/05_armory_2013_01_31_bx.html (discussing
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By April 2013, it was speculated that the city would designate a
developer to redevelop the armory. 163
After months negotiating terms, on April 17, 2013, twenty-five
member organizations of KARA and the developer signed an
enforceable CBA. 164 The CBA was called the first of its kind in New
York City, one that will provide generations of Bronx residents with
shared economic development benefits. 165 Soon thereafter, then Mayor
Bloomberg designated KNIC to redevelop the armory into the largest
ice sports complex in the world. 166
The numbers in the selected project are impressive. The 750,000
square foot ice center would house nine regulation-size rinks for skating
and hockey, including a 5000 seat arena. 167 It is expected to cost at least
$350 million, 168 create 267 permanent jobs, 169 and 890 temporary
construction jobs. 170
The voluntary agreement signed between KNIC and almost thirty
community groups 171 is equally impressive. KNIC promised to pay
every worker a living wage of at least ten dollars per hour with health
efforts between KARA and KNIC to reach a settlement on the terms of a community benefits
agreement).
163 Tanyanika Samuels, Decision Imminent in Fate of Kingsbridge Armory, N.Y. DAILY NEWS
(Apr. 22, 2013, 6:00 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/decision-imminentfate-kingsbridge-armory-article-1.1322131.
164 KNIC CBA, supra note 156. The author, who was counsel to the KARA coalition during
the CBA negotiation process with KNIC, prepared execution drafts of the CBA, and the signing
process is based on personal recollection and review of the final draft of the KNIC CBA.
165 DLA Piper Press Release, supra note 18 (“I have closely followed attempts to negotiate
community benefits agreements in New York City over the past ten years, and this is the first
credible CBA in the City. Congratulations to KARA and everyone involved. I have every
expectation that this agreement will deliver real economic benefits for the surrounding
communities. KARA and the developer have shown again that when developers and
communities come together as equals, everyone wins.” (quoting Julian Gross)).
166 Jennifer H. Cunningham, Bronx Community Board 7 Sets Aside Opposition to Approve a
Massive Ice Palace at the Former Kingsbridge Armory, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Sept. 18, 2013, 8:31
PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/bronx-community-board-okays-iceskating-palace-article-1.1459218; Winnie Hu, Plan for Ice Center in Bronx Armory Moves
Forward, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/24/nyregion/
bloomberg-announces-ice-sport-center-proposal-for-bronx-armory.html.
167 Hu, supra note 166.
168 Sally Goldenberg, Mark Messier Tussles with Mayor over Cuomo Funding for Kingsbridge,
POLITICO N.Y. (Mar. 28, 2016, 5:28 AM), http://www.capitalnewyork.com/article/city-hall/
2016/03/8594957/mark-messier-tussles-mayor-over-cuomo-funding-kingsbridge.
169 Hu, supra note 166. Permanent jobs might include full-time equivalent positions, which
actually involve multiple employees working part-time schedules. KNIC CBA, supra note 156,
at A-3.
170 Hu, supra note 166. The cost of securing the support of elected officials, including Diaz
and others, was substantial, as city lobbying records indicate that KNIC paid lobbying firm
James F. Capalino & Associates $197,500. Id.
171 Hu, supra note 166.
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benefits, or $11.50 without benefits. 172 These wages are pegged to the
Consumer Price Index and will increase annually. 173 KNIC will give
hiring preference to Bronx residents. 174
Further, KNIC will lease to the coalition, rent-free, almost 50,000
square feet of community space in the armory for ninety-nine years,
contract with minority and women-owned businesses, and give ice
skating time to public school children in surrounding neighborhoods.175
There are also detailed provisions in the agreement addressing green
building standards, such as installing water bottle filling fountains, and
providing water bottles to youth who participate in programs. 176
After the designation, the armory project was supported by Bronx
Community Board 7, 177 Diaz Jr., 178 the City’s Planning Commission, 179
and ultimately, the City Council. 180 Almost a year later, in October 2014,
KNIC CBA, supra note 156, at A-8.
Id.
174 Id. at A-9.
175 Id. at 6, A-11, A-18, A-20; Hu, supra note 131; Hu, supra note 158.
176 See KNIC CBA, supra note 156, at A-12 to -17.
177 Cunningham, supra note 166. Following a public hearing at Lehman College, the full
Board voted twenty to five in favor of the project. Testifying at the hearing about the CBA that
KARA and KNIC entered into, Pilgrim-Hunter stated that “[w]e have set a new standard,
across the country, for how development will be done in low-income communities.” Id.
178 Sarina Trangle, Armory Ice Center Barrels Through ULURP, RIVERDALE PRESS (Sept. 25,
2013),
http://riverdalepress.com/stories/Armory-ice-center-barrels-through-ULURP,53022.
Diaz’s office recommended the KNIC project be approved on September 20 at a hearing that
highlighted the $1.7 billion in shared economic development coming from the community
benefits agreement, and the Landmarks Preservation Commission approved the plan later that
day. Id.
179 Chris Pomorski, Ice, Ice Baby: City Planning Commission Approves Plan to Convert Bronx
Armory to Ice Skating Mecca, OBSERVER (Nov. 6, 2013, 5:52 PM), http://observer.com/2013/11/
ice-ice-baby-city-planning-commission-approves-plan-to-convert-bronx-armory-to-iceskating-mecca (summarizing the Commission’s unanimous vote to approve the project, and
Messier’s, Bloomberg’s, and others’ excitement at the project progressing).
180 The Council has a practice of deferring to the local council member in whose district a
given project is being voted on. See, e.g., Press Release, Helen Rosenthal, Council of the City of
N.Y., Land Use Committee Approves TF Cornerstone Proposal for 606 West 57th Street (Apr.
24, 2014), http://helenrosenthal.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/220128366-Press-ReleaseLand-Use-Committee-Approves-TF-Cornerstone-Proposal-for-606-West-57th-Street-April24-2014.pdf. In this case, Cabrera was won over by additional funds to address traffic and
parking issues. See Hu, supra note 131. Cabrera’s motives were under scrutiny as it came to
light that, during negotiations, he had unsuccessfully demanded KNIC pay $100,000 per year
for ninety-nine years to a nonprofit called Community Action Unlimited, which was associated
with Mr. Cabrera’s New Life Outreach International. Id.; see also Jennifer H. Cunningham,
Councilman Dodges Allegations He Tried to Secure Money from Kingsbridge Armory Developer,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Nov. 25, 2013, 9:29 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/
councilman-icy-answer-article-1.1528967; Gustavo Rivera Beats Fernando Cabrera in
Democratic State Senate Primary, NEWS 12 BRONX (Sept. 10, 2014, 10:30 AM), http://
bronx.news12.com/news/gustavo-rivera-beats-fernando-cabrera-in-democratic-state-senateprimary-1.9274846.
172
173
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KNIC entered into a ninety-nine-year lease with the city of New York
for the armory. 181
4.

KNIC CBA Challenges and Next Steps

As of this writing, there is an approved project to redevelop the
armory. The project has achieved a unique trifecta of (1) private
commitment from KNIC, (2) government approval from the legislative
and executive branches of the city government, 182 and (3) consensus
among the organized community groups and institutions that the
project should proceed as proposed and according to the CBA. 183 There
is also a private CBA between KNIC and the KARA coalition, sharing
economic gains over nearly the next 100 years. 184 The following are the
challenges that all parties faced achieving a CBA, difficulties they will
face in moving forward on the project, and how that particular CBA
contributes to the legal academic scholarship about CBAs generally.
a. A Redevelopment Eighteen Years in the Making
When the City took over the armory in 1996, the City, the Bronx,
and the Kingsbridge neighborhood were much different than they are
now. 185 Crime rates have a correlation to urban depopulation, which,
since 1996, has reversed as rates have fallen and the City’s population
has risen. 186 In 1996, the city was only starting to convey residential city181 Joe Anuta, Kingsbridge Armory Project Skates Past Obstacle, CRAIN’S (Oct. 16, 2014),
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20141016/REAL_ESTATE/141019922/kingsbridgearmory-project-skates-past-obstacle. Signing the lease had been held up by litigation brought
by Jonathan Richter, Marcus Wignell, and Jeff Spiritos, which was cleared when a Bronx judge
ruled against the three men. Id. Also announced in 2014 was a thirty million dollar equity
investment by Michigan-based Kresge Foundation. Id.
182 The statute of limitations to challenge the project approval in court through an Article 78
action in New York Supreme Court, the State’s trial court, lapsed 120 days after the Council’s
approval in December 2013. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801 (MCKINNEY 2008); see also LAW OFFICES OF
KEVIN P. SHEERIN, UNDERSTANDING ARTICLE 78 (2014), http://civilservice.sheerinlaw.com/
files/2014/06/sheerinlaw.com-Article_78_eBook.pdf. No lawsuits were filed.
183 There has been no organized opposition to the project, and any opposition to the project
has been unserious and unreasoned. See, e.g., Cunningham, supra note 166.
184 KNIC CBA, supra note 156, at 6.
185 Crime rates in 1996 were dropping from their peaks, though there were still 515 murders
reported during the first six months of 1996. See Clifford Krauss, 1996 Data Show Crime Rates
Are Still Falling in New York, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/07/03/
nyregion/1996-data-show-crime-rates-are-still-falling-in-new-york.html. In contrast, only 333
murders were reported in all of 2014. POLICE DEP’T OF N.Y.C., SEVEN MAJOR FELONY OFFENSES
(2015), http://www.nyc.gov/html/nypd/downloads/pdf/analysis_and_planning/seven_major_
felony_offenses_2000_2014.pdf.
186 Julie Berry Cullen & Steven D. Levitt, Crime, Urban Flight, and the Consequences of
Cities, 81 REV. ECON. & STAT. 159 (1999); Michael Howard Saul, New York City Population Hits
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owned property for redevelopment as affordable housing. 187 The
economic development projects of Mayor Rudy Giuliani’s
administration were focused on redeveloping 42nd Street, and sports
team stadiums. 188 Commercial development of city-owned property,
especially in low-income neighborhoods, was not high on the city’s
economic development agenda at the time.
Nevertheless, the KARA coalition formed in 1996 to shape the
redevelopment of the armory as a community space. 189 It took seventeen
years of advocacy, organizing, negotiating, testifying, and volunteering
to build a credible community coalition that a developer could take
seriously. 190 It also required the KARA coalition to organize against the
2009 proposal of The Related Companies to build up the power and
support it needed to negotiate and win the 2013 KNIC CBA. Going
forward, there are many new obstacles to clear, including obtaining
private financing, and keeping KNIC accountable for promises made.
b. KNIC Finances the Project and Resolves Internal Disputes
From the developer’s perspective, they still face a plethora of
market-based challenges. KNIC must convince investors to contribute
equity in the project. Several high profile investors have already made
equity investments. 191 But KNIC still needs to raise additional equity,
and to secure construction loans from lenders willing to take a risk on
this atypical development project. KNIC’s business model relies on
Record High, WALL ST. J.: METROPOLIS (Mar. 27, 2014, 3:09 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/
metropolis/2014/03/27/new-york-city-population-hits-record-high.
187 Directory of New York City Affordable Housing Programs, N.Y.U. FURMAN CTR. FOR
REAL EST. & URB. POL’Y, http://furmancenter.org/institute/directory/entry/third-party-transferprogram (last visited Mar. 4, 2016) (detailing the Third Party Transfer Program that the NYC
Department of Housing Preservation and Development created in 1996).
188 A Timeline of the Block, NEW 42ND STREET, http://www.new42.org/about/
redevelopment-timeline.aspx (last updated Apr. 2016); see also Charles V. Bagli, Despite
Criticism, Giuliani Pursues Ballparks as Economic Catalysts, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 2, 2000), http://
www.nytimes.com/2000/03/02/nyregion/despite-criticism-giuliani-pursues-ballparks-aseconomic-catalysts.html.
189 Telephone Interview with Alice McIntosh, supra note 134; Breaden Thompson,
Northwest Bronx Community and Clergy Coalition, PREZI (July 8, 2013), http://prezi.com/
s6bfatpjut72/untitled-prezi.
190 Redevelopment of Kingsbridge Armory, NW. BRONX CMTY. & CLERGY COALITION, http://
northwestbronx.org/what-we-do/k-a-r-a (last visited Mar. 4, 2016).
191 Joe Anuta, Kingsbridge Armory Ice Center Nets $30M Infusion, CRAIN’S (Aug. 12, 2014),
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20140812/REAL_ESTATE/140819966/kingsbridgearmory-ice-center-nets-30m-infusion. The investment, less than ten percent of the $350 million
needed to redevelop the armory, includes a market-rate investment from the Kresge
Foundation. Id.; see also Michael Buteau, Messier-Led Bronx Ice Center Gets $4 Million Bauer
Investment, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 19, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/
2014-08-18/messier-led-bronx-ice-center-gets-4-million-bauer-investment.
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“contract ice,” 192 which will generate their business plan claims, as well
as revenue sufficient to cover debt service and to pay investors. 193 It also
must resolve outstanding financial claims from Richter, Spiritos, and
Wignell. 194
c.

KARA Coalition Decides How to Build Out and Program
Community Space
The KARA coalition also faces challenges moving forward. It has to
continue to use its power to influence the benefits won in the CBA. For
instance, it must develop a consensus on building out and programming
the almost 50,000 square feet of community space. 195 The coalition must
also develop a proposal of its own to equitably divide space, charge
rents, and use funds from rents for community uses that the coalition
approves. 196 All these administrative tasks take resources and buy in
from the groups within the coalition.
With much work done, and much more to come, what can be
learned from the 2013 KNIC CBA to both improve outcomes of the
development at the Armory, and in other economic development
projects nationally? The next Section begins to address this question. It
analyzes the KNIC CBA from the perspectives of the community
coalition and of the developer.
B.

Analysis of the KNIC CBA

The KNIC project has been approved, and the time to challenge the
City Council’s approval of the Mayor’s designation of the KNIC to lead
the project has passed. 197 This Section analyzes the agreement viewed
from both sides of the transaction. It also addresses the agreement from
the perspective of the public, which is not a party to the agreement.
192 “Contract ice” refers to ice rink time that is contracted for certain periods of time for
various athletic endeavors (e.g., figure skating and amateur or professional hockey teams).
193 KNIC CBA, supra note 156, at Exhibit D.
194 Cruz, supra note 161.
195 Cabrera, and even de Blasio, have mentioned a hip hop museum being included in the
space, but the coalition itself, which controls the use of the space, has not yet taken a public
position on how the space will be used. Shant Shahrigian, Birth of Hip Hop to Be Honored with
New Museum at Armory, RIVERDALE PRESS (Mar. 19, 2014), http://riverdalepress.com/stories/
Birth-of-hip-hop-to-be-honored-with-new-museum-at-armory,53951; see also Michael
Howard Saul, Mayor de Blasio Takes Questions in Google Hangout, WALL ST. J.: METROPOLIS
(Apr. 11, 2014, 1:44 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/metropolis/2014/04/11/mayor-de-blasio-takesquestions-in-google-hangout.
196 KNIC CBA, supra note 156, at A-19, § 11.
197 See N.Y. C.P.L.R. 7801 (MCKINNEY 2008); supra note 182.
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Is the 2013 KNIC CBA a Good Deal for the Community?

The first goal of the KARA coalition was to secure an enforceable
agreement. With respect to this goal, KARA was successful. 198 But the
question remains: Did the community negotiate a good deal?
a. Valuing the 2013 KNIC CBA
One estimate of the overall benefits to the community contained in
the agreement is $1.7 billion. 199 This estimate presumably factors in both
cash and in-kind contributions from the developer to the community
through the KARA coalition over the ninety-nine year term of the CBA.
For example, the developer will provide specific dollar amounts of
benefits through the agreement.
These defined dollar amount benefits include an initial
contribution of eight million dollars in capital toward developing and
building out the community space. 200 Section 3(a)(ii) of the Community
Benefits Program has a $10,000 per year scholarship for ninety-nine
years for residents of the northwest Bronx to become accredited in
operating a geothermal and/or solar power system at the Armory.
Section 3(a)(v) includes a $250,000 fund for establishing and
administering a grant program for local businesses to make capital
improvements. 201
There is a so-called “run rate contribution” of $1,000,000 per year,
adjusted by the consumer price index, that the coalition can use to
purchase in-kind services, such as ice rink or classroom rentals, from
the developer. 202 Section 3(c) outlines a revenue contribution where the
developer pays $250,000 in the first year of the project, and going
forward pays 1% of gross ice rink rental revenue up to $25,000,000, and
2% of gross ice rink rental revenue above $25,000,000. 203 For example, if
gross ice rink rentals are $26,000,000 in a given year, KNIC contributes
$250,000, or 1% of $25,000,000, plus an additional $20,000, or 2% of
$1,000,000.
There are also certain benefits the developer agreed to that do not
have a definite dollar value assigned. For these benefits, some are easier
to assign a dollar value than others. For example, section 11 contains a
Community Space Lease term where the developer agrees to lease two
198
199
200
201
202
203

DLA Piper Press Release, supra note 18 (quoting Julian Gross).
Trangle, supra note 178.
KNIC CBA, supra note 156, at A-5, § 3(a).
Id. at A-5, §§ 3(a)(ii), 3(a)(v).
Id. at A-6, § 3(b).
Id. at A-6 to -7, § 3(c).
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areas on subterranean floors to the coalition for one dollar for ninetynine years. 204 One can assign a rental value to this space based on an
escalating dollar per square foot amount.
Other terms, like paying workers a living wage above the minimum
wage, can also be assigned a dollar amount based on the current
minimum wage. 205 Yet, other terms are more difficult to assign a
definite dollar value, though they have clear value for the community.
Section 6 requires that 51% of permanent workers are hired from the
local population so that local residents get priority access to jobs.206
Section 7 requires that 25% of all contractors hired during project
construction are Bronx-based minority and women-owned businesses,
with 25% of the project’s construction workers coming from local
neighborhoods. 207 Section 8 requires the developer to meet certain green
building targets, 208 and section 10 requires a Local Procurement Plan
ensuring that between 25% and 51% of project goods and services are
purchased from local businesses. 209 It is more difficult to assign a
definite dollar value to these requirements.
b. Risk Factors for the Community
It is possible that KNIC never intends to perform under the
contract and entered into it only to obtain the project’s approval. The
protection to the community coalition, however, is that the remedy
agreed to in the CBA is not money damages—it is specific
performance. 210 Presumably, should KNIC not perform, one of the
members of the coalition can compel performance with a breach of
contract claim under New York law. KNIC could plead government
coercion as a contract defense; however, given the private nature of the

Id. at Exhibit B (showing the community space on floor SL1 and SL2).
Id. at A-8, § 4.
206 Id. at A-9 to -11, § 6(c).
207 Id. at A-11 to -12, § 7(a).
208 Id. at A-12 to -17, § 8.
209 Id. at A-17 to -19, § 10.
210 Id. at 6, § 5(d). The remedy in CBAs is often specific performance instead of money
damages in order to avoid both the developer, and the community coalition, not honoring their
end of the bargain. See, e.g., Index of Docs, LAW OFF. JULIAN GROSS, http://juliangross.net/docs/
CBA/Staples_Cooperation_Agreement.pdf (last visited Aug. 20, 2015) (follow “CBA/”
hyperlink; then follow “Stapes_Cooperation_Agreeement.pdf” hyperlink); Index of Docs, LAW
OFF. JULIAN GROSS, http://juliangross.net/docs/CBA/Hunters_Point_Agreement.pdf (last
visited Aug. 20, 2015) (follow “CBA/” hyperlink; then follow “Hunters_Point_Agreeement.pdf”
hyperlink). With money damages there is also the risk that the community coalition will be
seen to have been bought out.
204
205
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agreement and the valuable consideration it received, such a defense is
unlikely to withstand scrutiny. 211
At this moment, the greatest risk to the community coalition is if
KNIC fails to raise the money it needs to move forward with the project.
If KNIC fails to finance the project, the promised benefits would not be
delivered. The coalition would need to renegotiate with any subsequent
developer.
Another risk is that KNIC might decide that it wants to withdraw
from the project entirely. To limit the risk to the coalition in the event of
a withdrawal, section 6(c) of the Cooperation Agreement has a cooling
off period of five years before KNIC can resubmit a proposal to develop
the Armory in the event of a withdrawal. This term is designed to guard
against a strategic withdrawal and reapplication by KNIC in order to
avoid its obligations in the CBA.
Other risks come both from inside and outside of the coalition.
From the inside, there is risk that one or more coalition members will
not be able to survive to enforce the agreement. This risk is minimized
by the fact that any or all of the twenty-five members can enforce all
terms of the agreement. 212 With twenty-seven decision makers, it is
likely that there will be disputes among dissenting parties. However, this
risk is minimized by having a strategic leadership committee, and an
open consensus decision-making model.
From outside the coalition, individuals and groups are already
trying to influence how the community space is used. Council member
Cabrera held a press conference with supporters of a hip hop museum
to call for space within the armory for the museum. 213 While it is up to
the coalition to decide how the space is used, Cabrera, or others, might
continue to push the coalition members in one direction or another.
Outsiders or internal decision makers might also argue vagueness
of particular terms for their own ends. While CBAs have not faced court
scrutiny thus far, it may be the case that a party seeks to enforce a
particular term through the court process. While this is a risk, it is a
small one given the care with which the agreement was drafted.
211 DLA Piper Press Release, supra note 18 (stating the opinion of the two lead attorneys
working for KARA and an outside CBA expert that the KNIC CBA is credible and will deliver
benefits to generations of Bronx residents).
212 KNIC CBA, supra note 156, at 1–2 (defining “Coalition”); c.f. Atlantic Yards Community
Benefits Agreement, DOWNTOWN BROOKLYN NEIGHBORHOOD ALLIANCE, http://thedbna.org/
atlantic-yards-community-benefits-agreement-2 (last visited Apr. 22, 2016). The coalition
could not enforce the housing terms once ACORN imploded. Norman Oder, Forest City Seems
to Be Backing Off Its Pledge to Have 50% of Affordable Apartments Be Larger Units. What Will
Bertha Lewis Say?, ATLANTIC YARDS/PACIFIC PARK REPORT (Nov. 18, 2011, 8:31 AM), http://
atlanticyardsreport.blogspot.com/2011/11/forest-city-seems-to-be-backing-off-its.html.
213 See Shahrigian, supra note 195.
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Is the 2013 KNIC CBA a Good Deal for KNIC?

There are two important questions to ask when approaching the
CBA from KNIC’s perspective: First, what is the actual value of the
promised benefits? And second, was the bargained for exchange
adequate to KNIC? So far, this Article has attempted to answer the first
question. Now, the Article turns to the questions of the adequacy of the
consideration KNIC received in the transaction, and what it had to
promise in exchange for that consideration.
Practically, KNIC succeeded where The Related Companies failed.
KNIC was able to secure nonopposition from the KARA coalition,
which almost ensured approval of the ice center project. In obtaining an
approved project, the 2013 KNIC CBA was 100% successful for the
KNIC Partners.
KNIC agreed to a magnitude and duration of community benefits
never before offered by a developer in New York City. 214 As mentioned
above, the project has continued to attract financier attention despite
the CBA’s promised benefits. One will know for certain once the project
moves forward; however, in the short term, it does not appear that the
CBA has hindered KNIC’s ability to attract investors in the project.
C.

Concluding Thoughts and Lessons Learned

The prospect of an ice rink development in the Bronx—let alone
the largest ice sports complex in North America—tends to be met with
skepticism. The African American, Dominican, Puerto Rican, and other
Caribbean backgrounds of the people that make up the Bronx
communities, particularly in the northwest Bronx, lack a history of ice
sports involvement. But involving traditionally underrepresented
communities is only part of the allure of the Kingsbridge National Ice
Center. The KNIC developers estimate an average of one year round
indoor ice rink per every 100,000 people—in a city of an estimated 8.3
million people (1.4 million in the Bronx alone) there should be eightythree rinks instead of the current seven year round rinks, and none in
the Bronx. 215
One result of the approved development has been uncertainty
among landlords across the street about what to do with their properties
214 Complaint, KNIC LLC v. N.Y.C. Econ. Dev. Corp., No. 22507/2016E (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr.
12, 2016) (No. 22507/2016E), http://www.norwoodnews.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/
KNIC-Lawsuit-.pdf.
215 KNIC CBA, supra note 156, at Exhibit D.
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given the specter of the KNIC development. Landlords have started
giving tenants of mom and pop retail shops along West Kingsbridge
Road month-to-month lease renewals, and in some cases sought a fifty
percent increase in rent. 216 Buildings surrounding the site continue to
command high sales prices. One in particular, boasting ten occupied
retail storefronts and fifty-seven apartment units, sold recently for
fifteen million dollars, 217 having been sold the year before for only $4.5
million. 218
It is perhaps logical that the KNIC development might drive real
estate speculation and increase property values in the neighborhood.
This result is largely not addressed in the KNIC CBA. While residential
tenants may benefit from rent regulated apartment units, 219 commercial
tenants have no such protection.
Mitigating the effects of increased commercial rent and increased
residential rent for market rate tenants is a challenge. While tax
increment financing districts capture some of the value of increased
property prices from landlords, 220 no such similar mechanism is easily
implemented to limit the rents that tenants, both commercial and
residential, pay. 221 CBA coalitions should consider involving
commercial and residential tenants in CBA negotiations to brainstorm
and consider alternative strategies for limiting the negative impacts of
increased rents on existing businesses. The KNIC CBA included a
$250,000 small business grant program, 222 and a “good faith efforts”
216 Wendy Davis, Rents Shoot Up Across from Kingsbridge Armory, CRAIN’S (Nov. 3, 2014),
http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20141103/REAL_ESTATE/311029990/rents-shoot-upacross-from-kingsbridge-armory.
217 David Cruz, Another Property Sold Blocks from Kingsbridge Armory, NORWOOD NEWS
(June 25, 2015), http://www.norwoodnews.org/id=18408&story=another-property-sold-blocksfrom-kingsbridge-armory.
218 Search by Document ID/CRFN, AUTOMATED CITY REGISTER INFO. SYS. (ACRIS), http://
a836-acris.nyc.gov/DS/DocumentSearch/CityRegisterFileNumber (last visited Apr. 22, 2016)
[hereinafter ACRIS] (search “2014021800080002” in the “Enter the Document ID Number”
field).
219 For a description of the two types of residential rent regulations in New York State, see
Raymond H. Brescia, Line in the Sand: Progressive Lawyering, “Master Communities,” and a
Battle for Affordable Housing in New York City, 73 ALB. L. REV. 715, 719–21 (2010). Residential
rents in rent-stabilized apartments may only be increased by landlords by an amount set by the
Rent Guidelines Board. Mission Statement, N.Y.C. RENT GUIDELINES BOARD, http://
www.nycrgb.org/html/about/about.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2015).
220 For an explanation about tax increment financing, see JOEL MICHAEL, RESEARCH DEP’T,
MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, TAX INCREMENT FINANCING (2014), http://
www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/ss/sstif.pdf.
221 MICHAEL, supra note 220. Tax increment financing districts only tax property owners—
any increase in tax revenue from renters must come through increased rents charged by
landlords. Id.
222 KNIC CBA, supra note 156, at A-5.
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provision to provide technical assistance to businesses with three to five
employees who might sell goods to the KNIC. 223 It is possible that grant
program funds and technical assistance might address the commercial
lease negotiation issues. However, thinking through the impact of
project development on rising commercial rents prior to CBA
formation is a key lesson learned.
It remains to be seen how the various parties will work together in
the Community Advisory Council (CAC). The CAC governance is to be
determined collectively and cooperatively by CAC members. 224 Whether
and how the CAC can make decisions will largely impact the
implementation of the KNIC CBA terms. As of this writing, the City’s
Economic Development Corporation has not released the KNIC lease
from escrow; however, the Economic Development Corporation
extended the escrow agreement. 225
III. THE IMPACT OF CBAS ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
Part I discussed the existing literature about CBAs, definitional
issues, and current trends in the CBA movement. Part II presented a
case study of the 2013 Kingsbridge Armory CBA and assessed its
significance within the CBA movement. This Part assesses the impact of
CBAs on economic development through the lens of community
organizing campaigns and other constituencies, such as taxpayers,
policymakers, and practitioners.
This Article proposes a framework for assessing the effectiveness of
CBAs through four key issues: First, it looks at the extent to which CBAs
effectively resolve disputes around a project’s approval. To evaluate
these criteria we shall investigate the extent to which CBAs resolve
disputes outside of litigation, preapproval, as well as an interpretation of
the CBA through implementation.
Second, this Article evaluates the extent to which CBAs enhance
civic participation in land use approvals. Third, it looks at the ability of
CBAs to protect taxpayers by valuing a project’s approval and
negotiating an enforceable set of benefits provided in exchange for that
value. Fourth, and last, is the success that CBAs have in avoiding state
action and the trappings of constitutional protections for developers

Id. at A-7.
Id. at A-2.
225 Goldenberg, supra note 168 (stating that the Economic Development Corporation
spokesperson Anthony Hogrebe expressed willingness to work with the KNIC team).
223
224
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who, this Article argues, tend to need them less than marginalized
communities in isolated rural or urban areas.
A.

Avoiding Costly Litigation and the Ability to Solve Problems Prior to
Project Approval

Power imbalances between developers and community groups
frequently result in development moving forward whether or not it is
opposed. Typically, deals are struck either prior to a project’s approval,
as is most frequently the case with CBAs, or after a project is approved,
as in a settlement following litigation. Litigation and the court process
adds time and expense to an outcome that more likely than not is
similar to what would be reached through a CBA at the outset. This
Article argues, therefore, that CBAs, despite their costs and challenges,
are preferable because they frequently resolve disagreements about
public project approvals in advance, thus avoiding the costly and time
consuming court process.
The ability of a CBA to stand alone without subsequent lawsuits
speaks to the quality of the CBA at resolving differing positions, while
CBAs that result in contentious litigation were probably not that good
to begin with. In other words, one strength of CBAs is that they can be
judged on their ability to resolve disputes around a project. For example,
if a CBA is reached, yet there is still significant litigation among
dissenting parties, it is unlikely that the CBA is effective. On the other
hand, if a CBA is reached, and only minimal lawsuit activity occurs by
groups with fringe points of view, it is more likely than not that the CBA
is truly effective. This Article suggests further study in this area around
quantitative analysis of dispute resolution activity, including number of
lawsuits filed, and whether there was a CBA.
Of course, not all constituent groups will be happy all of the time.
Nevertheless, CBA processes are useful because they lead to better
decisions, or at least to the types of decisions that get resolved through
litigation if there is no CBA, or an unsuccessful CBA negotiation
process.
1.

Litigation Activity Surrounding Atlantic Yards

An example of this analysis is the 2005 Atlantic Yards CBA, which
has been criticized for its lack of inclusivity within the community
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coalition. 226 Following the CBA’s execution, there were as many as
thirty-seven lawsuits filed related to the project. 227 In addition, in June
2014, a group called BrooklynSpeaks negotiated an agreement to speed
up the creation of affordable housing at Atlantic Yards. 228 While the
agreement was not styled as a CBA (i.e., BrooklynSpeaks was not a
party), the agreement between the developer and the State of New York
achieved much of the goals advanced by the coalition.
2.

Lack of Litigation Activity Related to Successful CBA Campaigns

Federal or state case law on the enforceability of CBAs does not
exist thus far, 229 which perhaps supports the proposition that successful
CBAs have not needed court intervention. To prove this proposition for
certain, one should also look at economic development projects without
CBAs and how they tend to have, or not have, significant litigation. In
the case of the Willets Point economic development project, where no
CBA was included in the project approval process, there has been
chronic litigation related to almost every stage of the project and its
approvals. 230
The author is unaware of any controversial development that had
no CBA, but which also had little to no significant litigation. It is
possible to imagine such a project. However, to appease dissenting
groups, it is likely that the parties involved spent significant time
coming to an agreement on terms, such that litigation was unnecessary.

226 Lavine & Oder, supra note 80, at 316 (asserting that most of the eight groups that
participated in negotiations were created specifically to sign the CBA, while other established
groups were excluded).
227 See, e.g., Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50 (2d Cir. 2008); Apple v. Atl. Yards Dev. Co., No.
11-CV-5550 (JG), 2014 WL 5450030 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 27, 2014); Kaur v. N.Y. State Urban Dev.
Corp., 933 N.E.2d 721 (N.Y. 2010); Goldstein v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 921 N.E.2d 164
(N.Y. 2009); Develop Don’t Destroy (Brooklyn), Inc. v. Empire State Dev. Corp., 942 N.Y.S.2d
477 (App. Div. 2012); 730 Equity Corp. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., No. 1689/2012, 2014
WL 2134562 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 7, 2014); Heron Realty Corp. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp.,
No. 1690/2012, 2013 WL 3213086 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 21, 2013); In re N.Y. State Urban Dev.
Corp., No. 32741/09, 2010 WL 702319 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 1, 2010); Brooklyn Bridge Park Legal
Def. Fund, Inc. v. N.Y. State Urban Dev. Corp., 825 N.Y.S.2d 347 (Sup. Ct. 2006).
228 The author was counsel to BrooklynSpeaks during this negotiation.
229 Been, supra note 8, at 30.
230 A recent decision appears to have fatally wounded the redevelopment of Willets Point.
Avella v. City of New York, 13 N.Y.S.3d 358 (App. Div. 2015); see also Charles V. Bagli, City
Declines to Fight in Court for Land Deal in Stadium’s Shadow, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2015, at
A19.
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CBAs Increase Civic Engagement

CBAs can be an effective way for bringing diverse voices into land
use approvals. Alejandro Camacho has written a multipart article, titled
Mustering the Missing Voices, about how current government approval
processes neglect large swaths of stakeholders in the land use approval
process. 231 This Article draws on Camacho’s research to support the
argument that CBAs increase civic engagement, which is positive both
in bringing diverse voices into land use, and in encouraging participants
in other aspects of civic life. Camacho points out elsewhere that CBAs
reflect the lack of public engagement in land use approvals due to the
bilateral nature of land use negotiations. 232
The CBA movement is rooted in the movement for Smart
Growth. 233 Smart Growth proponents advance the idea that
development should be governed by the three E’s: the economy, the
environment, and equity. 234 A jobs-housing balance, and transitoriented development, are key principals for Smart Growth advocates. 235
The inclusion of Smart Growth advocates, labor, and other urban
constituencies within the CBA movement has meant a more diverse
group involved in land use decisions as communities organize. 236 In the
field of behavioral psychology, there is support for the conclusion that
people tend to be more likely to consent to decisions, even if they
disagree with them, once they have had an opportunity to participate in
the decision-making process. 237 The notion of legitimacy derives from a
source of shared values or shared consent, and varies from one society
to the next. 238 It is logical that if individuals have an opportunity to
shape a process, then they are more likely to support the result.

231 Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for
Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions:
Installment One, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2005); Alejandro Esteban Camacho, Mustering the
Missing Voices: A Collaborative Model for Fostering Equality, Community Involvement and
Adaptive Planning in Land Use Decisions: Installment Two, 24 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 269 (2005).
232 Alejandro E. Camacho, Community Benefits Agreements: A Symptom, Not the Antidote,
of Bilateral Land Use Regulation, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 355 (2013) (arguing that CBAs do not solve
issues related to land use, however, CBAs are a temporary fix to the current bilateral land use
regulation scheme).
233 GROSS WITH LEROY & JANIS-APARICIO, supra note 4, at 5.
234 Id. at 4.
235 Id. at 5.
236 Id. at 6.
237 Camacho, supra note 232, at 365 & n.63 (citing TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE
LAW (1990)).
238 See, e.g., Anthony Bottoms & Justice Tankebe, Beyond Procedural Justice: A Dialogic
Approach to Legitimacy in Criminal Justice, 102 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 119, 132–33 (2012)
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One study of CBA participants found that increases in public
participation on development outcomes ranked highest in ways that
CBAs improve development. 239 In other instances where citizens are
given the opportunity to participate in public decision making, such as
deciding how capital budget dollars are allocated, residents from diverse
communities are shown to participate at higher rates than in local
elections. 240 This includes women, youth, and individuals from
immigrant communities. 241
While more study is needed in this area as it applies to CBAs,
evidence strongly suggests that civic participation is a key aspect to
CBAs’ impact on economic development. As communities organize and
gain sophistication, more diverse voices are added to the land use
decision process, which was heretofore the exclusive domain of
businesses and developers. 242 The inclusion of diverse voices yields
better decisions and more positive impacts on citizens’ lives.
C.

Protecting Taxpayers

This Article has argued that CBAs provide a critical function in
allowing community groups to enforce key terms in development
projects outside the political process. Elected officials, the argument
goes, may or may not enforce specific terms of a deal depending on a
variety of forces. A political check for voters to elect a new
representative is less effective than simply having community groups
directly contract as parties to agreements and give them the ability to
enforce those agreements.
In existing CBAs, including L.A. Live and Kingsbridge Armory so
far, community groups are able to enforce CBA terms outside of
government intervention. Although, CBA terms are often also included
in relevant development agreements or leases. 243
(discussing the work of David Beetham and Jean-Marc Coicaud, specifically that legality,
shared values, and consent are key to studying legitimacy).
239 Musil, supra note 20, at 847.
240 ALEXA KASDAN ET AL., URBAN JUSTICE CTR., A PEOPLE’S BUDGET: A RESEARCH AND
EVALUATION REPORT ON PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING IN NEW YORK CITY 16 (2014), http://
cdp.urbanjustice.org/sites/default/files/CDP.WEB.doc_Report_PBNYC-cycle3FullReport_20141030.pdf.
241 Id. at 16–17.
242 GROSS WITH LEROY & JANIS-APARICIO, supra note 4, at 6.
243 In the instance of the Kingsbridge Armory CBA, the lease contains the same access terms
for community groups, thus enshrining the “right to skate” in the commercial lease. Ben
Kochman, Developer, City Finalize Lease to Turn Vacant Kingsbridge Armory into Ice Center,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Oct. 16, 2014, 5:33 PM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/bronx/
developer-signs-lease-kingsbridge-armory-article-1.1977160.
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By contrast, the development surrounding the new Atlanta Falcons
Stadium has no such similar community group CBA accountability
check. 244 Taxpayers have no protection to ensure they derived a fair
bargain given the tremendous public equity invested in the stadium’s
construction. 245 True, one can monitor to see how the thirty million
dollar Westside Neighborhood Prosperity Fund and Westside Tax
Allocation District are spent. 246 But there is no agreement governing the
benefits provided in exchange for the public subsidy spent. 247
Invest Atlanta announced the initial recipients of the Westside Tax
Allocation District Community Improvement Fund in November
2014. 248 Almost two-thirds of the fifteen million dollar Fund were
allocated toward construction of 407 apartment units near the stadium
site, and a mixed-use shopping, hotel, and apartment development. 249 It
appears that the Blank Foundation has hired an experienced
professional to implement the Westside Neighborhood Prosperity Fund
in the area surrounding the stadium. 250
In the case of both funds, taxpayers or community groups are not
represented at all in decisions made about allocating resources.
Taxpayers need protection from developers making commitments that
they fail to adhere to after a project is approved. In the Atlanta example,
commitments have been made without a binding mechanism to enforce
those terms. Often, commitments are included in project development
agreements; however, these agreements may only be enforced by
governments and are subject to the changing winds of elected office.
The benefits of a CBA are that the benefits themselves can be enforced
244 See Rabouin, supra note 11 (stating that the community benefits “plan” was adopted
without the agreement of any community coalition).
245 See deMause, supra note 122 (stating that $554 million in public financing was provided
without any community benefits beyond the anticipation of jobs and tax revenue that would be
associated with a new stadium).
246 See Westside Neighborhood Prosperity Fund Background, supra note 12.
247 See discussion supra Section I.F.2.
248 Collin, Invest Atlanta Announces Funding for Westside Projects, ATLANTA INTOWN (Nov.
20, 2014), http://www.atlantaintownpaper.com/2014/11/invest-atlanta-announces-fundingwestside-projects.
249 Id. Other recipients include a soul food restaurant and an office building’s energy
efficiency program. Id.
250 Our Staff & Board of Directors, ARTHUR M. BLANK FAM. FOUND., http://
www.blankfoundation.org/staff-and-board (last visited July 26, 2015) (“Frank [Fernandez]
joined the Foundation in January 2014 to lead and implement the Westside Neighborhood
Prosperity Fund, a program designed to contribute to the transformational revitalization and
redevelopment of Vine City, English Avenue, Castleberry Hill and other adjacent
neighborhoods.”). For more information about the Westside Neighborhood Prosperity Fund
application process, see Westside Neighborhood Prosperity Fund—Application Process, ARTHUR
M. BLANK FAM. FOUND., http://blankfoundation.org/westside-application-process (last visited
Aug. 25, 2015).
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directly by the groups that are the intended beneficiaries—outside the
political process. This is a protection to taxpayers who are supposed to
benefit from the commitments. It is also a protection to taxpayers who
saw the project approved with certain commitments. CBAs provide
enforcement in the event that those commitments are not upheld.
D.

Avoiding State Action

As discussed in Parts I and II, CBAs function outside of
government involvement to (1) permit community groups to directly
enforce CBA terms, and (2) to avoid constitutional protections afforded
developers by the Supreme Court. Viewing the success of CBAs in
avoiding state action is significant in assessing their influence on
economic development projects. First, if community groups cannot
enforce CBA terms, it undermines the benefits of CBAs that this Article
has highlighted. Second, if CBAs involve state action, then the terms
that can be included in a CBA are arguably significantly limited to what
has both a “nexus” and “rough proportionality” to the project’s
approval. 251
This Section begins by analyzing what amounts to state action in
the case of CBAs. It then considers the practical reality that as soon as a
developer receives project approval, it is significantly less likely for a
developer to claim that there was impermissible state action. After
looking at both factors, we can draw conclusions about the importance
of avoiding state action in the effectiveness of CBAs in influencing
economic development projects.
1.

What Amounts to State Action?

There is some disagreement in the literature about what might
constitute state action in a CBA negotiation. Vicki Been on the one
hand suggests that local governments should not consider CBAs and
CBA terms in land use approvals in order to avoid unconstitutional
conditions doctrine issues, or, if CBAs are to be considered, that they
meet certain standards. 252 Been also writes that it may be appropriate for
government to review CBAs in economic development approvals.
Developers who do not like the conditions set can simply decline to

251
252

See discussion infra Section III.D.2.
Been, supra note 8, at 31–34.
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develop the project. 253 The New York City Comptroller Report
recommended that CBAs only be used in major projects with more than
500,000 square feet of development, on more than twenty-seven acres,
and receiving an excess of seventy-file million dollars. 254 This definition
and recommendation is consistent with Been’s notion that local
governments can consider CBAs when economic development subsidies
are provided. 255
Local government review of CBA terms as part of economic
development subsidy approval is similar to planned unit development
(PUD) review. PUD regimes exist in cities including Washington, D.C.,
Baltimore, Boston, and Arlington and Alexandria, Virginia. 256 Often in
PUD review, developers receive a density bonus for approval of a master
development plan. Developers and elected officials negotiate land use
approvals all of the time. The difference in the CBA context is that
community groups can enforce them. Ultimately, this perhaps exposes
the challenges related to negotiating CBAs more than it does in
determining state action, or not.
In the Kingsbridge Amory CBA, was it state action for the council
member to say that a CBA was necessary in order for him to approve
the project? 257 Was it state action for the community board to form an
“alliance” with the community coalition, which, arguably led to the
community coalition obtaining the necessary leverage to negotiate
terms? 258 What about the fact that the principals were negotiating with
the council member who requested, unsuccessfully, a sum of money for
an organization connected to him?259 What about the fact that the
council member’s chief of staff was present in the room during
negotiations? 260

Id. at 34.
TASK FORCE ON PUBLIC BENEFIT AGREEMENTS, supra note 65, at 24.
255 Been, supra note 8, at 35.
256 DC ZONING UPDATE: PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENT STUDY 34–39 (2007), https://
www.communicationsmgr.com/projects/1355/docs/PUD_Study_FINAL.pdf; Alexandra Croft
Moravec, An Analysis of Planned Unit Development (PUD) Regulations and Processes in
Washington, DC: A Development Risk Management Case Study 67–68 (2009) (unpublished
Masters Project, University of North Carolina).
257 See Hu, supra note 131.
258 See NORWOOD NEWS, supra note 160.
259 See Hu, supra note 131.
260 See Cruz, supra note 161.
253
254
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Consequences of State Action

Depending on how local government land use regulators are
involved in CBA negotiations, CBAs may encounter Supreme Court
precedent preventing unconstitutional conditions or exactions.261
According to the Court, any terms that the government seeks in order to
permit a development to go forward must have an “essential nexus” to a
legitimate state interest claimed when rejecting the developer
proposal. 262 The condition must also have “rough proportionality” to
the extent and impact of the proposed development. 263 Monetary
exactions must also satisfy the nexus and rough proportionality
conditions set by government. 264
Were CBAs to involve a government setting conditions, which they
as a rule do not, this line of Supreme Court protections would apply.
Since local governments should not be conditioning project approval on
CBA terms, then this analysis is not necessary. It is therefore desirable
for developers and community groups to negotiate directly through
CBAs.
3.

What Is the Likelihood that a Developer Will Raise State Action as
an Issue After a Project’s Approval?

CBAs settle disputes. From a practical perspective, it is unlikely
that a developer will enter into a CBA, obtain project approval, and then
turn around and claim they were wronged by impermissible
government action. In the case of a successful approval, a developer
would be foolish to challenge the administrative decision that granted it
the right to build. In the case of an unsuccessful approval, the terms
negotiated in the CBA would be unenforceable since CBA terms are
conditioned upon the project moving forward. Development projects
are very costly, even at the preapproval, and recently postapproval,
stages. Therefore, if a CBA is reached, developers are more likely to
move ahead with the project instead of attempting to tie themselves up
in litigation.

261
262
263
264

Been, supra note 8, at 13–14.
Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987).
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 391 (1994).
Koontz v. St. John’s River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2599 (2013).

DE BARBIERI.37.5.3 (Do Not Delete)

2016]

6/6/2016 2:58 PM

COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS
E.

1821

Recommendations

CBA campaigns are currently underway in towns and cities across
the country, and elsewhere in North America. In addition to the
examples discussed around the Obama Presidential Library, the Atlanta
Falcons Stadium, the Somerset County wind farm, and the Kingsbridge
National Ice Center, there are community benefits debates commencing
around other projects, including: the Atlanta Braves mixed-use
development in Cobb County Georgia, 265 redevelopment of Union
Square in Somerville, Massachusetts, 266 Buffalo, 267 throughout projects
in Canada, especially Ontario, 268 Manitoba, 269 the Gateway Real Estate
Development in Chicago, 270 the high-speed rail in Illinois, 271 rail station
redevelopment272 and urban revitalization projects 273 in Long Island,
New York, and projects funded in northwest Indiana, 274 Maryland, 275
265 ATLANTA BRAVES, ATLANTA BRAVES MIXED-USE DEVELOPMENT SUMMARY, http://
atlanta.braves.mlb.com/atl/downloads/suntrust-park/mixed-use-fact-sheet.pdf
(proposing
100% privately financed stadium, hotel, and retail complex).
266 Union Square Redevelopment, SOMERVILLE, MA, http://www.somervillema.gov/
departments/ospcd/economic-development/union-square-redevelopment (last visited Apr. 23,
2016).
267 Buck Quigley, Fruit Belt Residents Still Want a Community Benefit Agreement, ARTVOICE
(May 14, 2015), http://artvoice.com/issues/v14n19/news_feature.html.
268 John Lorinc, The Plan: Train and Hire Toronto’s Neediest for Six-Figure Jobs. The Catch:
How to Find Them, GLOBE & MAIL (Apr. 17, 2015, 3:37 PM), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/
news/toronto/the-plan-train-and-hire-torontos-neediest-for-six-figure-jobs-the-catch-how-tofind-them/article24008225; Sara Mojtehedzadeh, Why the Woodbine Gaming Deal Could Be a
Pathway to Good Jobs, THESTAR.COM (July 12, 2015), http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2015/07
/12/why-the-woodbine-gaming-deal-could-be-a-pathway-to-good-jobs.html;
Laurie
Monsebraaten, Groundbreaking Infrastructure Law a Boon for At-Risk Youth, THESTAR.COM
(June 7, 2015), http://www.thestar.com/news/gta/2015/06/07/groundbreaking-infrastructurelaw-a-boon-for-at-risk-youth.html.
269 Avery Zingel, Remote Manitoba First Nation Gets Funding for New Bridges, CBC NEWS
(Feb. 20, 2015, 8:02 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/remote-manitoba-firstnation-gets-funding-for-new-bridges-1.2965652.
270 La Risa Lynch, West Siders Demand Community Benefits Agreement for New Medical
District Development, PROGRESS ILL. (July 21, 2015, 2:12 PM), http://progressillinois.com/
quick-hits/content/2015/07/21/west-siders-demand-community-benefits-agreement-newmedical-district.
271 Doug Finke, House Passes Bill to Create High-Speed Rail Oversight Panel, ST. J.-REG.
(Apr. 24, 2015, 7:09 PM), http://www.sj-r.com/article/20150424/NEWS/150429642.
272 Deborah S. Morris, Huntington Station Redevelopment Benefits Agreement Approved;
Provides Fees for Community Programs, NEWSDAY (Jan. 14, 2015, 9:28 PM), http://
www.newsday.com/long-island/towns/huntington-station-redevelopment-benefits-agreementapproved-provides-fees-for-community-programs-1.9808783.
273 Ted Phillips, supra note 83.
274 Lu Ann Franklin, Gary Pastor, Award Nominee, Lives by Motto ‘Never Quit’, TIMES
(Northwest Indiana) (Jan. 13, 2015), http://www.nwitimes.com/news/local/lake/gary-pastoraward-nominee-lives-by-motto-never-quit/article_c9660419-9cc8-565e-8841c634ac1e09a5.html.
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Miami, 276 Milwaukee, 277 Minnesota, 278 New Haven, 279 and University of
California’s Richmond Campus. 280 CBAs have the potential to positively
impact many different communities. This Article makes a couple of
recommendations for how these communities might approach the CBA
negotiation process given the KNIC CBA and other examples discussed
above.
1.

Protecting Residential and Commercial Tenants from Rising Rents

As development projects in low-income urban and rural areas
move forward, land values tend to increase. Existing landowners are
well positioned to reap the returns of higher land values. 281 Tenants, on
the other hand, subject to the residential and commercial rental
markets, face the prospect of displacement when land values increase.
There are several mechanisms that CBAs might implement to
address this issue. In the KNIC CBA, for instance, there is a “revenue
contribution” that amounts to profit sharing between the developer and
the CBA signatories. 282 The funds from the revenue contribution
amount to one percent of gross ice rink rental revenue up to twenty-five
million dollars, or $250,000, and two percent of gross ice rink rental
revenue over twenty-five million dollars. 283 These funds could be used
275 Ellison Barber, Minority Business Owners: Casino Bids Bias, WUSA9 (Mar. 20, 2015,
12:37 PM), http://www.wusa9.com/story/news/local/maryland/2015/03/20/minority-businessowners-casino-bids-bias/25081185.
276 David Smiley, FIU Study: Worldcenter Subsidy Deal Falls Short, MIAMI HERALD (May 4,
2015,
2:00
AM),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/miami-dade/
article20038665.html.
277 Don Walker, Milwaukee Urban League Backs Public Financing for Bucks Arena, J.
SENTINEL (Milwaukee) (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.jsonline.com/news/milwaukee/milwaukeeurban-league-backs-public-financing-for-bucks-arena-b99475770z1-298777101.html.
278 ALL. FOR METRO. STABILITY, COMMUNITY BENEFITS AGREEMENTS: GROWING A
MOVEMENT IN MINNESOTA (2007), http://www.metrostability.org/efiles/CBAREPORT.pdf;
Eliot Brown, Use of Taxpayer Money for Pro-Sports Arenas Draws Fresh Scrutiny, WALL ST. J.
(Mar. 8, 2015, 7:17 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/use-of-taxpayer-money-for-pro-sportsarenas-draws-fresh-scrutiny-1425856677?mod=djem_jiewr_PS_domainid.
279 Steven M. Seigel, Community Benefits Agreements in a Union City: How the Structure of
CBAs May Result in Inefficient, Unfair Land Use Decisions, 46 URB. LAW. 419 (2014); Allan
Appel, Looney Calls for UI to Clean Up English Station, NEW HAVEN INDEP. (Aug. 5, 2015, 3:29
PM),
http://www.newhavenindependent.org/index.php/archives/entry/looney_calls_for_an_
english_station.
280 Alexandra Yoon-Hendricks, Community Concerned About Gentrification with Proposed
Richmond Global Campus, DAILY CALIFORNIAN (July 16, 2015), http://www.dailycal.org/2015/
07/16/community-concerned-gentrification-proposed-richmond-campus-major-development.
281 ACRIS, supra note 218; see also supra text accompanying notes 217–18.
282 KNIC CBA, supra note 156, at A-6 to A-7.
283 Id.
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for tenant organizing work, funding property acquisition for
community or cooperative use, or in some other manner.
Of course, the challenges involved in deciding how to allocate these
funds are manifold. Who benefits, and to what extent? It is possible to
create cooperative housing or commercial space that can be rented out
on a lottery system to qualifying individuals. There are examples of real
estate investment cooperatives in areas such as Minnesota 284 and New
York City. 285 CBA funds could be allocated to such programs.
2.

Consider Jurisdiction-Wide Implications and Fixes

Municipal government is reluctant to plan on a jurisdiction-wide
scale. 286 Because land use decisions are likely to remain the purview of
local elected officials, 287 CBAs—alongside the law of public land use
approval—will continue to be the norm for how decisions are made.
Even if a CBA is not reached for a particular project, CBA campaigns
alone are changing how developers act in the marketplace.
The fact that a CBA affects only a single development site is
inherently limiting. It is difficult to influence jurisdiction-wide policy
through one off negotiated agreements. Occasionally, CBA campaigns
may lead to changes in municipal law, as in the adoption of a living
wage law for city-sponsored developments in New York City. 288
Studying and permitting negotiated CBA terms to bubble up to the level
of jurisdiction-wide law is one possible outcome of the CBA movement.
One local government scholar has suggested a way that CBAs can
work with municipal-wide payment systems to compensate local
residents who have developments in their neighborhoods. 289 David
Schleicher has proposed a Tax Increment Local Transfer (TILT)
payment system that combines Tax Increment Financing with Trade
Adjustment Assistance theory, which is used to negotiate free trade
deals. Schleicher proposes TILTs as a mechanism to “trade” among

NE. INV. COOPERATIVE, http://www.neic.coop (last visited Jan. 18, 2016).
NYC REAL EST. INV. COOPERATIVE, http://nycreic.com (last visited Jan. 18, 2016). The
author is an adviser to this organization.
286 The bilateral negotiation model, either through negotiated zoning or through the use of
development agreements, is the baseline land use approval model in most U.S. states. Camacho,
supra note 232, at 360.
287 The New York City Council, for example, has a practice of deferring to the local council
member in whose district a given project is being voted on. See supra note 180.
288 See supra note 71 (discussing the NYC Living Wage).
289 Schleicher, supra note 30, at 1725–32.
284
285
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municipal-wide interests and local opposition groups. TILTs and CBAs
may work together, he writes, to achieve municipality-wide goals. 290
CONCLUSION
The question this Article has set out to answer is: Do community
benefits agreements benefit communities? The answer this Article
proposes is that community benefits agreements do benefit
communities—if they are negotiated and implemented in a transparent
and accountable manner. The Article has come to this answer through a
case study of the negotiations and execution of the KNIC CBA, and
through analysis of other projects that lacked a CBA.
This Article presented a framework for assessing the role of CBAs
in economic development projects. The framework focused on four
aspects, including the ability of CBAs to resolve disputes surrounding
significant development projects, to increase civic participation and
encourage diverse stakeholder voices in land use approvals, to protect
taxpayers with a binding enforcement mechanism, and to avoid state
action and a host of constitutional challenges. Through the lens of this
framework, it assessed how CBAs actually can and do benefit
communities.
Despite this conclusion, it is of course possible to imagine
situations where CBAs do not benefit communities. Some of these
situations were mentioned above, while some may be new. It is
important to understand when CBAs fail to benefit communities.
CBAs that are not transparently negotiated can lead individuals or
groups to reap benefits that are limited to benefiting only a small group
of people and not the community as a whole. One can imagine a
scenario where a politically connected individual or group negotiates a
CBA with a developer. It would not be surprising if only those
individuals or groups benefitted to the exclusion of the broader
community. In other words, outright theft or graft resulting from a
corrupt transaction is possible. Such a transfer is bound to have a
harmful effect on the relevant community.
Likewise, CBAs that do not solicit community input also run the
risk of not benefitting the community. Civic participation and public
engagement are keys to successful CBAs. Failure to solicit feedback or
ideas from large segments of the community can lead to CBAs that are
contrary to the interest of the community.

290

Id.
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Overly paternalistic CBAs may not benefit communities. That is,
CBAs with terms that assume a community wants a certain benefit but
does not specifically investigate whether there is demand for such a
benefit may be wasteful or ineffective. Avoiding assumptions about
what benefits a community can avoid this aspect of harmful benefits.
Similarly, CBA terms may lead to waste or other harmful effects
because the local infrastructure cannot support the long-term intended
benefits. 291 Considering whether a CBA is the best mechanism to
distribute benefits is an important step in the economic development
process. Perhaps more advantageous alternatives exist. 292
CBAs tend to lead to development that increases land value and
that may then force out long-time residents. CBAs as tools of economic
development may in fact impede development by furthering
gentrification and increasing displacement. Balancing the needs of longtime residents with new arrivals is key to ensuring that CBAs do benefit
communities.
The goal of this Article was not to argue that community benefits
agreements are appropriate in all communities everywhere. Rather, it set
out to show the situations in which CBAs benefit communities.
Communities, government, and developers may benefit from
considering the situations in which CBAs do benefit communities when
crafting compromises to challenging land use approvals. Land use
disputes are not likely to magically disappear—and CBAs are not the
mechanism to achieve total land use harmony. Although, in certain
cases, CBAs do and will have powerful positive impacts on generations
of low-income families.

291 International development projects sometimes rely on assumptions, for example, that
capital investment in a rural well in an impoverished community will benefit the community,
while in fact the community lacks the infrastructure to maintain the well. Annie Kelly, Money
‘Wasted’ on Water Projects in Africa, GUARDIAN: KATINE CHRONICLES BLOG (Mar. 26, 2009,
9:15
AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/society/katineblog/2009/mar/26/water-projectswasted-money.
292 Some economists and scholars tout, for instance, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)
as an appropriate alternative to direct welfare support. For an explanation of the EITC
program, see Ann L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the Limitations of Tax-Based
Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533, 534 (1995).

